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PREFACE 
This thesis is an attempt to examine the various factors which 
helped S;.'itllul~e the rise of the Whig abolitionists from 1840 to 1848. 
Historians have written little on this segment of the Whig party; and 
they have limited their studies primarily to the Whig abolitionists 
from Massachusetts. Although many respected leaders of the Whig abo-
litionists were from Massachusetts, the movement was not isolated to 
that one state. The Whig abolitionists claimed the basis for their 
campaign was to prevent slavery in newly a~quired territories and 
eventually, to abolish all slavery in the United States. They used a 
variety of methods. They had seen the failure of the Liberty party 
in 1844 when abolitionists outside of the two regular parties, the 
Whigs and the Democrats, nominated James G. Birney. Thus, the Whig 
abolitionists tried to work within their own party until they could 
persuade members of the Democratic party, who were sympathetic to the 
antislavery cause, to join them in a coalition with other abolitionists. 
Meanwhile, abolitionists in Britain and in the United States helped 
the Whig abolitionist~ in the United States congress. As interest in 
annexing Texas to the United States developed, abolitionists held world 
conventions in which they denounced any such action by the United 
States. They claimed that southerners were trying to establish slavery 
., 
in new territories by expansion. After Texas was annexed, the Whig 
abolitionists assured the nation that a war with Mexico would follow. 
Their predictions came true and they began to correspond with dissatis-
fied Democrats. The result was the Freesoil party, a coalition of 
Whig abolitionists, antislavery Democrats, and former members of the 
Liberty party. 
An examination of the rise of the Whig abolitionists will enable 
the student of the Mexican War to understand the basis for the charge 
of abolitionists that the Mexican War was caused by a "slaveocracy 
conspiracy." Furthermore, this thesis will attempt to determine the 
influence the Whig abolitionists had on political parties from 1846 to 
1848. 
There are many people who deserve my gratitude for their aid and 
advise in writing this thesis. Dr. Homer L. Knight, the head of the 
History Department, has been a source of encouragement from the begin ... 
ning of my graduate studies. His genuine interest in all students has 
been an asset to the History Department for many years. Dr. Norbert 
Mahnken, the director of graduate studies in the History Department, 
made suggestions as my second reader which were highly beneficial. I 
also want to thank Dr. Odie B. Faulk, my advisor and mentor, for his 
advice, inspiration, and gentle prodding for the last few years. Dr. 
Faulk' s endless energy and his good,. dispq.si_tio.n h~l~ei:Lme, /, 
. :'·_! . .-.. . 
through those frequent days in the life of a graduate student when 
everything seems to go wrong. 
There are people outside of the History Department I want to thank, 
..... too. The people who live with a graduate student often are forced by 
their proximity to share the burdens of that graduate student. Connie 
Moyers, my friend and roo1l!lllate, has listened patiently as I planned 
this thesis and has offered many suggestions to improve it. I owe my 
family the greatest gratitude. Throughout my life my parents, Mr. and 
Mrs. Wayne Conrad Haun in Enid, Oklahoma, have sacrificed in many ways 
for their children. My father and mother encouraged us to have 
ambitious dreams and helped us try to fulfill these dreams. My brother, 
Ronald, and my sister, Judy,have helped me in my studies, also. The 
love which my family has for each other stimulated me to seek an educa-
tion. 
Despite the aid of all these people, this thesis may have numerous 
errors. Any mistakes which have been made are mine alone and I accept 
full responsibility for them. 
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THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE RISE OF THE WHIG ABOLITIONISTS 
While much has been written about British involvement in the 
Republic of Texas, little has been published concerning British influ-
ence on the domestic politics of the United States during that same 
period. Frederick Merk implies that the American Whigs remained con-
solidated throughout this period. 1 Another historian, Ephraim Douglas 
Adams, states that British policy influenced American politics; however, 
he does not elaborate on that point. 2 In his classic work, Justin H. 
Smith suggests that a great number of Whigs were "intensely hostile to 
the incorporation of Texas. 113 Nevertheless, he does not relate the 
British to that hostility. Yet there was a clear division among the 
American Whigs after the annexation of Texas, and this split did not 
erupt suddenly. 
Certainly, there was a reason for a split within the Whig party. 
The Whigs opposed the annexation of Texas; yet Congress, by joint reso-
lution, incorporated that state. The Whigs said, in their campaign 
against the bill in 1845, that a war with Mexico would result and that, 
1Frederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 
1843-1849 (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1966). 
2Ephraim Douglas Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 
1838-1846 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963-Y:-p. 13. 
3Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York: Barnes & 
Noble, Inc., 1941), p. 239. 
2 
if this should occur, Mexico would be justified in its actions. 
However, when President James K. Polk, a Democrat, asked Congress to 
declare war against Mexico, only sixteen Whig congressmen voted against 
the declaration. 4 These men were known as Whig abolitionists, and the 
background to these events clearly shows why they voted as they did. 
They were not pure American organisms, but hybrids who had been 
"fertilized" by the British anti-slavery impulse~ 
The Whig party was never a national party, only a political 
coalition. The issue of slavery was anathema to the party's leaders 
for if it was made a national issue, it would divide the party along 
sectional lines. Not wanting to lose elections, they ignored slavery 
in their national platforms, and at the same ti~e, allowed each state 
organization to do as it wished concerning the problem of slavery. 
Thus the forces of abolition soon infiltrated many state conventions, 
and Massachusetts became the caldron of Whig abolitionists, who also 
were known as "Conscience Whigs" or "Young Whigs." These men placed 
moral politics above party politics. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (B.F.A.S.S.), through 
its influence on British governmental policy and through its ties with 
American abolitionists, had a major role in the rise of the Whig 
abolitionists. The Conscience Whigs opposed the annexation of Texas, 
for they thought it would extend the hated institution of slavery. 
Therefore they found themselves in complete agreement with the 
B.F.A.s.s. 
However, the American government questioned British motives con-
4 . · _ ,.,· ""•5?11r ... ,,;~:,,;..;::·,~,"' ·. 
United States Congrefs"s,i-H"ouse-, 29th Cong., 1st sess. ;:·'1~46:, 
Journal, May .11, 1846, p. 239. 
3 
cerning Texas. Were the British pursuing an imperialistic course 
under the guise of humanitarianism? Apparently the American public 
thought so, for in the election of 1844 James K. Polk was elected 
President and annexation shortly was realized. As a result, the Whig 
abolitionists began a campaign against the extension of slavery. 
They had allies in the United States supporting their crusade; 
yet these allies, known as abolitionists, had divided into two factions. 
William Lloyd Garrison led those who believed in non-resistance through 
withdrawal from the government, while Henry B. Stanton and James 
Gillespie Birney directed those who supported political actions through 
a third-party movement. 5 Thus the Liberty party developed. Garrison's 
followers remained within the American Anti-Slavery Society and cru-
saded for various other reform movements, such as women's rights, in 
addition to the abolition of slavery. The men of the Liberty party, 
who initiated the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, thought 
Garrison subjugated the cause 'of .anti-slavety to other reforms. 
Within the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the New York 
Committee dominated many decisions. 
At the suggestion of this committee, the B.F.A.S.S. called a world 
anti-slavery convention in 1840. The various British societies against 
slavery took sides in the quarrels of the American movements. The 
B.F.A.s.s. society originated in 1839 with its main policy being 
universal emancipation. Until 1838, the British abolitionists, sup-
5John L. Thomas, The Liberator: William Lloyd Garrison (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), PP• 277-293. See also, Dwight L. 
Dumund (ed.), Letters of James Gilleseie Birney, 1831-1857 (2 vols., 
Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966r, ·· pp. 481-483. Louis Ruchames, 
The Abolitionists, ~- Gollecti,on of Their Writings (New York: Capri-
corn Books, 1964), pp. 209-218. 
4 
ported by members of all parties, achieved their greatest successes 
through Parliament. Consequently the British movement gained prestige. 
In 1840, the "New Administration" (those abolitionists in the metro-
politan areas of London, Birmingham, Liverpool, and Bristol) supported 
the American Liberty party delegates. The more rural societies praised 
Garrison's representatives. Controlled primarily by the London 
associations, the B.F.A.S.S. opposed Garrison's supporters. However, 
both American abolitionist groups sent delegates to the convention, 
and, except for a fraction of the Garrisonian representatives, the 
delegates of both groups were seated. Despite a warning notice which 
excluded women from the convention, the American Anti-Slavery Society 
sent female representatives. At the opening session an American Gar-
risonian spokesman, Wendell Phillips, moved that all accredited persons 
be admitted to the convention; but the convention tabled his proposal. 
After this action, the women accompanied by escorts ascended the stair-
way to the balcony. 
Upon his arrival three days later, Garrison renewed agitation on 
the subject. Failing in this attempt, he expressed his objection by 
refusing to sit with the rest of the convention and by joining the 
women in the balcony. In addition to this rejection, the delegates 
of the convention did not ask Garrison to speak at the anniversary 
meeting of the B.F.A.s.s., while they did request speeches from Birney 
and Stanton. During the dinner parties, Garrison surprised his hosts 
with his "heresies. 116 Stanton and Birney delighted at the bad impres-
sion Garri_son _made, while they continued to gain greater influence 
6 
'Thomas, The Liberator, p. 297. 
5 
with the B.F.A.s.s. 7 
Meanwhile, the Texas government asked for British mediation in its 
war with Mexico. Texans also requested treaties of commerce. But Great 
Britain found this appeal to be a double-edged sword. If England helped 
the slave state of Texas sever itself from free Mexico, Englishmen would 
be shocked, for anti-slavery feelings ran high in Great Britain. Yet, 
if Great Britain allowed the United States to annex Texas, the British 
public would also be enraged. If the United States, regarded as the 
citadel of slave holders, expanded its territory, Great Britain's de-
pendence on American cotton would increase. 
Due to this fear of domestic disapproval, the British government 
postponed the recognition of Texas; however, its officials encouraged 
Mexico to make peace with Texas. They did this to prevent Texas from 
seeking annexation to the United States for protection from Mexico. 
In 1840, Britain offered Texas a treaty of recognition and trade, which 
included Mexican agreement for an armistice, on condition that the Tex-
ans approve a convention for suppression of the maritime slave trade. 
Consumation of these treaties would be delayed for two years. During 
the year of 1841, domestic problems within Mexico and Great Britain 
pushed the question of Texas into the background. 
The Congress of the United States also was in turmoil. A few 
abolitionists, dissatisfied with both Garrison and the Liberty party, 
decided to lobby for anti-slavery legislation. They found aides for 
their cause in Congress. When Joshua Leavitt, an abolitionist lobbyist, 
returned to Washington in the fall of 1841, he discovered some Whigs 
7 . Ibid., p. 297. 
6 
ready to abandon party policies and to make slavery the leading issue. 
At this moment the Whig party began its division, with those against 
slavery becoming more attentive to abolitionists. 
These congressmen called themaelves "a Select Committee on Slave-
ry," and they planned a program of bills and resolutions which·would 
8 lead to an open discussion of slavery. Previously, the Speaker of the 
House referred petitions and memorials praying for the abolition of 
slavery to a select committee where Southerners buried the matter. 
However, the unyielding ex-President, John Quincy Adams, led the fight 
for repeal of this so-called "gag-rule." In arguing for the right of 
petition, Adams invariably introduced the subject of slavery. Southern 
congressmen, disregarding party lines, called Adams a traitor and.at~ 
tempted to censure him. Yet he did not stand alone! Other Whig in-
surgents Joshua Giddings of Ohio, William Slade of Vermont, Nathaniel 
Borden of Massachusetts, Seth Gates of New York, and Francis James of 
Pennsylvania--rallied around him. Leavitt's lobbyists, including 
Theodore Weld, scurried into the battle. 
Two months previously on December 30, 1841, Weld had arrived in 
Washington at the request of the Whig revolters. They had provided 
him money for traveling exRenses, access to the Library of Congress, a 
room, stationery, and other facilities. Weld had realized the immense 
potential of his new position and resolved to make full use of it des-
pite the financial hardships his family would have to endure because of 
his absence. 9 With a maj9r party disclaiming slavery in Congress, the 
8Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, The Anti-Slavery Impulse, 1830-1844 (New 
York: o. Appleton-Century Company, 1933), p. 180. 
-9 
Benjamin P. Thomas, Theodore~: Crusader for Freedom (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 196. 
7 
abolitionists' cause would gain publicity in national newspapers. 
Although Weld did not like the political atmosphere of the city of 
Washington, he did enjoy the location of the boarding house which the 
Whigs had found for him. Spriggs' house was located directly in front 
of the Capitol, and the iron railing around the Capitol Park came with-
in fifty feet of the door. Every morning before breakfast Weld escaped 
from the political arena in the Spriggs' house to the park where he 
could find solitude. After the early walk he returned to his boarding 
house where he ate breakfast and conversed with the other boarders about 
slavery, abolition, and runaway slaves. Colored servants waited on 
these men during these discussions, and Weld marveled at this paradoxi-
cal situation. 
Giddings and Gates also resided at Spriggs' boarding house, which 
soon became known as "the Abolition House." There they would consult 
with Leavitt and Weld on strategy against slavery. A few weeks after 
his arrival, Weld met the Massachusetts t"epresentative, John Quincy 
Adams. Both men admired each other. During the last two weeks of 
January, Weld watched from the gallery as Adams defended himself against 
Southern denunciations. Each evening Adams met with the abolitionists, 
who fired his imagination as well as his speeches with charges apout 
the system of slavery. By February 7, it had become apparent that the 
censure of Adams would be a political disaster; thus the resolutions 
of censure ignominiously fell to defeat. Weld regarded this moment as 
"the first victory over slaveholders in a body" since the foundation 
10 of the government. 
lOBarnes, The Anti-Slavery Impulse, p. 187. 
8 
Without hesitation Giddings continued the battle in Congress. 
Joshua Reed Giddings, Adams' closest friend, represented Ohio's Western 
Reserve and had been brought into.· the abolition movement by Weld in 
1839. Giddings drew himself up to his full six feet two inches, pushed 
his flowing white locks from his heavily furrowed brow, and presented 
another petition for the dissolution of the Union. He was not an 
apprentice in this field, for Southern Congressmen had warned him be-
fore that should he dare set foot in the South, he would be hanged. 
Although they did not reprimand him this time, he would be censured 
later by his angry Whig colleagues when he attempted to present his 
11 resolutions on the case of the Creole. As a result, Giddings resigned 
his seat in the.House and went home to stand for re-election in his 
district. Without the Whig party's support, Giddings was returned to 
Congress, and the Whigs resolved themselves to his presence. 
In a series of published letters, Giddings attempted to define 
the problem of slavery for both the North and the South. He contended 
that there was no need for the Liberty party if the Whigs would clearly 
h . b. . 12 state t eir o Jectives. He said that if the Whig party wanted to win 
13 
elections, a coalition with the Liberty party was essential. No one 
heeded this advice--until the Whigs lost the Presidential election in 
11 
In 1841, an American ship, the Creole, sailed from Virginia to 
New Orleans with a cargo of one hundred and thirty-five slaves. During 
the voyage the slaves mutineered, killing one person and wounding 
several others. They then set sail for the British port of Nassau, where 
they were given their freedom. The United States protested the ille-
gality of the matter but the British did nothing. 
12william H. Pease and Jane H. Pease (eds.), The Antislavery 
Argument (Kansas City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company-;-1°965), p. 414. 
13Ibid., P• 417. 
9 
1844. When Giddings returned to Congress, he found the issue of slavery 
no longer disguised under the cloak of the right to petition. With the 
aid of the abolitionists who would research in the Library of Congress, 
the Whigs began to question slavery and exposed it in its rawest fonn 
to the public. 
Meanwhile, Weld continued to lobby for further converts in Cong~ 
ress. During the winter of 1843, the Abolitionists House had many 
visitors: members of the New York Committee, a British Abolitionist, 
and Lewis Tappan. At this "headquarters of abolitionism," British 
abolitionists asked Weld to unite the anti-slavery factions of the 
North, but he refused to try. Also, the B.F.A.S.S. and the American 
abolitionists wanted him to attend the second World Anti-Slavery 
Convention in London, but Weld, clinging to anonymity, rejected the 
invitation. Despite his indifference to fame, Weld's name meant a 
great deal in England where he became known as the greatest of all 
14 
American anti-slavery men. Weld stayed in Washington until April, 
1842--long enough to see the peach blossoms and the magnolias and to 
smell their perfume in the soft spring air. 
During this period of consolidation between Whig abolitionists and 
their abolitionist advisors, rumors ran rampant of a British plot to 
destroy slavery in Texas and the United States. In the summer of 
1843, the Texan agent in Washington notified the American State De-
partment that annexation of Texas was no longer open to discussion. 
President John Tyler grew fearful. The American Secretary of State, 
Abel P. Upshur, already had received infonnation from "a private citizen 
14 
Thomas, Benjamin P., Theodore~, p. 172. 
10 
f:rom Maryland," Duff Green, about the so-called British scheme.15 
Green, an ardent foe of abolition, was in England in 1841 when Parlia-
ment proposed to lower the duty preferences given sugar from British 
colonies with free labor. The supporters of this measure in Parliament 
reasoned that the measure would compensate fo:rmer slaveholders for 
emancipation of their slaves and help them compete with powerful slave 
markets in Cuba and Brazil. Led by Sir Robert Peel, the Conservatives 
induced Parliament to reject the proposal and to give the emancipation 
experiment a chance to succeed. As a result, Lord Melbourne's ministry 
fell, and Peel established his own. To Green, this event ciearly 
illustrated the failure of British emancipation of slaves. lndicting 
British policy, G:reen said England attempted to maintain its commercial 
and manufacturing superiot'ity by a war on slavery and slave trade in 
the United States, Brazil, and Cuba. If England were victorious in 
these countries, its colonies could sell their raw products cheaply 
16 through the leveling of the market. 
Later, in June, 1843, Green suppiied another rumor. The second 
World Anti-Slavery Convention intrigued him. The American and British 
abolitionists stated that the annexation of Texas "would be one of the 
17 
greatest cklamities to befall a human race." The British abolition-
ists knew that Texan and Southern newspapers were repo:rting "British 
15united States. Senate Documents, 28 Cong. 1st sess. (Serial 
435), No. 341, 50-53 •. 
16Ibid., 50-53. 
17The Times (London), June 21, 1843. 
11 
influence paramount in Texas. 1118 The key speaker of the convention, 
Lord Morpeth, spoke hopefully of prospects for the abolition of slavery 
. T 19 in exas. Word of his speech reached the United States before the 
twenty-fifth of July. Furthermore, the Society adopted resolutions 
that they trusted the abolition movement in the United States would be 
"encouraged and strengthened by the due exertion of the influence of 
20 
the Govermnent and people" of England. Anothe+ member of the Society 
announced Lord Aberdeen's ~tatement that Great Britain would spare "no 
21 
legitimate means to abolish slavery in Texas." An American delegate 
at the convention, Lewis Tappan, suggested that the abolition of 
slavery in Texas would hurt Virginia and the Carolinas' slave trade so 
22 much that they would be forced to eliminate slavery. 
After the convention, a delegation of abolitionists met with Lord 
Aberdeen, British Foreign Secretary. Although Green was not present 
at this meeting and the conversation was not recorded, Green wrote Up-
shur confirming British plans toward Texas. Green, who despised abo-
litionists, contended that Aberdeen discussed the possibility of his 
govermnent's underwriting of a loan to Texas to finance the emancipation 
of Texan slaves. Since London was the banking center of the world at 
this time, Green suspected these loans would have imperialistic ties 
18 
Ibid., 
19 . Ibid. 
20 b"d I 1 ., 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid. 
June 22, 1843. 




Perhaps this rumor evolved from the proceedings of the anti-slavery 
convention rather than from Aberdeen's post-convention conversations 
with the abolitionists. Ashbell Smith, the Texan minister to Great 
Britain, was present at the convention, and he reported in a letter 
to the Texan Secretary of State, Anson Jones, a similar story. Accord-
ing to Smith, various plans were discussed at the convention. He said 
abolitionists had suggested Aberdeen should guarantee interest on a 
loan to be applied to the purchase of the slaves and their emancipa-
tion, provided that the further introduction of slaves be prohibited. 
Another plan was to raise money to buy land from the Texan goverrnnent 
in large quantities; the money gained would enable Tesas to abolish 
slavery. This in turn would increase European emigration to the Lone 
Star Republic. He also stated that a strong possibility existed that 
24 Britain would soon obtain Mexican recognition of Texas. 
Furthermore, Smith maintaine~ Englishmen wanted Texas to become 
a refuge for fugitive slaves from the United States. In fact, aboli-
tion in Texas was not as important to England as the results which 
Texan abolition might have on the United States. 25 Texas would become 
a rival to the United States in the production of cotton and sugar. 
The Texan minister related that this would harm slavery in the Southern 
United States and because of the smuggling of manufactured goods from 
23Abel P. Upshur to W. S. Murphy, Texas, August 8, 1843, in Senate 
Documents, 28 Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 435), No. 341, pp. 18-22. 
24Ashbell Smith to Anson Jones, Diplomatic Correpondence of Texas, 
American Historical Association (Report of~), part 2, Vol. II, 
pp. 1099-1103. 
25Ibid., p. 1103. 
Texas to the United States, American agriculture, manufactures, and 
26 
commerce would be hanned. 
13 
Smith's ideas gained support on August 18 when Parliament debated 
the British government's policy on abolition in the Western hemisphere. 
Lord Brougham asked Aberdeen to clarify Britain's position. In ad-
dition, Brougham speculated that Mexican recognition of Texas could be 
used to force abolition in that state, and this would promote abolition 
of slavery in the United States. In glowing tenns, he spoke of Texan 
soil and of Texas' accessibility to the Gulf of Mexico and to the 
Mississippi River. 27 Without disputing Brougham, Aberdeen replied in 
vague tenns about England's recent acknowledgement of Texan inde-
pendence, about the treaties of commerce, and about abolition of slave 
trade. Beyond this he was "most anxious for abolition of slavery in 
28 
Texas" and "throughout the world." 
News of this statement reached the United States and caused a 
furor. Upshur sent Edward Everett, the American minister in London, 
to speak with Aberdeen and to detennine the truth about the British 
interests in Texas. Everett reported that Aberdeen denied meeting with 
29 
Texans over the subject of abolition. Later, in a letter to Smith, 
Aberdeen disclaimed any intentions of interference in Texan affairs; 
26Ibid. 
27 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), 3rd series, Vol. 71 (August 18, 1843), pp. 915-917. 
28Ibid., pp. 915-917. 
29united States, Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 
435), No. 341, pp. 38-42. 
14 
however, Aberdeen added, Britain did hope for abolition in Texas. 30 
In the United States the new Secretary of State, (following the 
death of Upshur), John C. Calhoun, corresponded with Green, and Calhoun 
maintained that the British were intent on preventing the annexation 
of Texas to the United States. In his letters to the new British 
minister to America, Sir Richard Pakenham, Calhoun derided the supposed 
31 
British plot and spoke very strongly in defense of slavery. Again, 
Aberdeen reiterated British policy towards Texas in the same fashion 
of those statements he had made to Smith and Everett. Calhoun chose 
to ignore Aberdeen's response--for what he wanted was not a British 
defense but a suspicious America. This would be good propaganda in 
Congress as well as in the election campaign which was rapidly ap-
proaching. On April 12, 1844, Calhoun signed a treaty for the annexa-
tion of Texas, and Tyler submitted it to the Senate along with selected 
dispatches which would convince the Senate of a British plot. The 
press foiled Calhoun's attempt to maintain secrecy, however. 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, a Democrat from Missouri, challenged 
the completeness of the evidence which was used to support annexation 
through passage of this treaty. He asked why Aberdeen's replies to 
Smith and to Everett were missing. Meanwhile, the national parties 
nominated delegates to their conventions for the presidential election 
of 1844. The Whigs selected Henry Clay, who blurred his position on 
annexation by two contradictory letters he had written. However, the 
30Justin H. Smith,~ Annexation of Texas, p. 91. 
31John c. Calhoun to Lord Aberdeen, Ireland, Irish University 
Press Series, Parliamentary Papers (Slave Trade), Vol. 89 (April 27, 
1844), pp. 606-607. 
Democrats chose James K. Polk, who clearly stood for annexation of 
Texas. James G. Birney, the nominee of the Liberty party, rejected 
annexation. After the nominating conventions completed their work, 
the Senate rejected the annexation treaty by a vote of 16 to 35. 32 
Thus the treaty became a leading issue in the campaign. 
During this election year in the United States, Great Britain 
intentionally avoided decisions concerning Texas which could be used 
by Polk's followers to arouse further anti-British feeling among the 
American people. However, in secret agreements with France, Great 
Britain suggested a plan to prevent Anlerican annexation of Texas. 33 
Peace and preliminary recognition of Texas independence would be made 
by Mexico. Furthermore, negotiations on the Texan-Mexican boundary 
would be conducted while France and Great Britain guaranteed Texan 
15 
independence, even to the extent of armed support. But France withdrew 
from the agreement, leaving Britain with sole responsibility for the 
guarantee, and Mexico appeared to be planning an invasion into Texas. 
Therefore, Aberdeen abandoned the plan. 
In the United States, Polk won the election in the Electoral Col~ 
lege with 170 votes to Clay's 105. Yet the majority of the population 
voted for Clay and Birney. Had these two parties united and nominated 
one candidate with a definite anti-slavery policy, they probably would 
have won the election. Giddings had proposed this two years earlier, 
but no one listened. Because of Clay's dubious position on annexation, 
many abolitionists had voted for Birney. 
32congressional Globe, 28 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 698. 
33Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, p. 95. 
16 
After the election, a lame-duck Congress introduced and passed a 
joint resolution for the annexation of Texas. President Tyler, believ-
ing Calhoun about the British plot and thinking he should act instantly, 
sent an American representative to Texas to offer annexation. When Polk 
assumed office, he countermanded the instruction, then he changed his 
mind and ordered it confirmed. England, in its last effort, continued 
to try to gain Mexican recognition of Texas. On March 1, 1845, Tyler 
signed the joint resolution. 
Thus the British involvement with Texas and with slavery had 
greatly influenced the rise of the Whig abolitionists. With the 
British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society seeking to shape English policy 
toward Texas, the British and American abolitionists had agreed to op-
pose the annexation of Texas to the United States. American abolition-
ists, who were frequent visitors to the World Anti-Slavery Conventions, 
had lobbied in Congress against slavery and had influenced various 
Whig congressmen. These Whig congressmen had realized that their 
party would hav~ to fight against the annexation of Texas to prevent 
the expansion of slavery. Yet the Whig party had failed to take a firm 
stand. Fearing British control of Texas, the American public had 
elected Polk, an expansionist. Uniting with American abolitionists, 
the Conscience Whigs had split the Whig party. Without British in-
volvement in Texas, its annexation might have been prevented for a 
while, and the question of slavery might have been postponed by a 
national political party. However, when the Whig party had divided 
along sectional lines, the Democratic party also had begun to split. 
From that time forward, there would be sectional arguments on national 
issues. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ELECTION OF 1844 AND THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 
The American people had three choices in the election of 1844: 
James K. Polk, a Democrat who wanted Texas annexed; James G. Birney, 
a Liberty party man who opposed the annexation of Texas; and Henry 
Clay, a Whig, whose position on the annexation of Texas wavered. The 
three differed on other issues, but the question of Texas remained the 
most prominent issue. of their campaigns. That issue served as the 
divider between Northwestern Democrats and Southern Democrats, 
between Whigs and Liberty men, and between Whig Abolitionists and 
the rest of the Whig party. The election of James K. Polk carried with 
it not only the annexation of Texas but a war with Mexico--and a nation 
clearly divided along sectional lines. 
In 1844 the Democrats struggled for a semblance of cohesion. 
A faction existed in the South under the leadership of John C. 
Calhoun, that wanted Texas annexed, and which upheld slavery. In the 
Northwest the Democrats, led by Lewis Cass and Stephen A. Douglas, 
wanted Oregon annex~d; although they stood against slavery, they would 
stoop to anything to gain Oregon. The Northeastern Democrats did not 
condone slavery, and they did not want Texas annexed; these Democrats 
supported Martin Van Buren. Therefore, when the party met in Balti-
more, Maryland, for its national convention, it had to make some sort 
of compromise. The Southern delegates threatened to bolt the conven-
tion and form their own party. The Northwesterners spent long hours 
talking to Calhoun's delegates, trying to make an agreement. The 
1 
result was the bargain of 1844--the "Oregon and Texas" plank. The 
18 
Northwestern delegates and the Southern delegates reached a compromise. 
With an Oregon and Texas plank in the Democratic platform, a balance 
between the free- and slave-soil partisans existed, and the party's 
sectional participants found a common meeting ground. Polk, a dark-
horse candidate, became the Democratic presidential nominee by a unani-
mous vote, and George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, received the vice-
presidential nomination. 
Those who supported Van Buren for the nomination would later 
regret giving their support. Dallas gained his nomination only because 
Silas Wright of New York, a friend of Van Buren, refused the nomination 
2 
saying he did "not choose to ride behind the black pony." Indeed, 
Polk had not ranked as one of the party's most influential leaders. 
Presented by his own state of Tennessee as a vice-presidential con-
tender, Polk had only recently tasted political defeat. He had been 
speaker of the national House of Representatives and then governor of 
his state. Yet he twice had been defeated since that time while run-
ning for the governorship of Tennessee. However, Van Buren promised 
to support the party's nominees, and he kept his promise. And when 
election day Cqme, Van Buren's support in New York for Polk helped de-
1clark E. Persinger, "The Bargain of 1844 as the Origin of the 
Wilmot Proviso," Oregon Historical Society, Vol. XV, 1914, as quoted 
in Charles Boxton Going's David Wilmot: Free-Soiler (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1924), pp. 119-20. 
2 
Edward M. Shepard, Martin Van Buren (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1916), p. 411. 
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cide the nation for Polk. 
Polk won the state of New York not only because Van Buren supported 
him but also because a third party, the Liberty party, drained many 
abolitionists' votes from the Whig party. On August 30, 1843, the 
Liberty party's delegates had gathered in a tent over one-hundred feet 
in diameter in front of the Buffalo courthouse. With over a thousand 
delegates and some one thousand to four thousand spectators.· The 
party nominated James G. Birney of Kentucky for the presidency and 
Thomas Morris of Virginia for the vice-preaidency.3 Because the Liberty 
party and the Whig party appeared opposed to the annexation of Texas 
and the Democratic party did not, a great rivalry developed between 
the Liberty men and the Whigs for antislavery votes. Nine-tenths of 
. 4 the abolitionists were drawn from the Whig party. The Whigs maintained 
that since their party opposed annexation of Texas, it would be better 
for Liberty men to support the Whig candidate rather than throw their 
votes away. 
Had the Whigs nominated someone whose position on slavery and 
annexation was clear, the Liberty men might have listened to this Whig 
reasoning. However, Henry Clay was a slaveholder who had refused to 
free his slaves at Birney's request in 1834. 5 His subsequent actions 
convinced Birney and the Liberty party that he was definitely not 
opposed to slavery. Yet they could not be as positive about Clay's 
3 Betty Fladeland, James Gillespie Birney: Slaveholder to Abo-
litionist (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 225. 
4George Rawlings Poage, Henry Clay and the Whig Party (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1936), p. 112. 
5 Fladeland, James Gillespie Birney, p. 234. 
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position on the question of annexing of Texas, for it appeared that Clay 
was not absolutely in opposition. In April, 1844, Clay wrote his 
"Raleigh Letter" in which he maintained that annexation at that time 
was a danger to the national character and would force the nation into 
a war with Mexico. This would endanger the integrity and financial 
6 
condition of the Union. Many Whigs thought Clay abandoned annexation 
in this letter. To alleviate these fears the Great Compromiser wrote 
two more letters in which he said he would be glad to see Texas annexed 
without dishonor or war and with the consent of the states as to fair 
7 
and reasonable terms. If elected, he promised to judge annexation 
on its own merits. 
The Liberty party gained many abolitionists' votes from this 
statement. Clay tried to divorce the issue of slavery from annexation, 
while Birney said that annexation of a pro-slavery Texas would be un-
constitutional. In the summer of 1844 the Whig and Liberty rivalry 
became even more bitter. Birney attacked Clay by saying he served the 
slave power, and Clay accused Birney of being secretly Catholic. 
Clay also stated that Birney had only sold his slaves in Alabama to 
make money, and that the English supported Birney. Meanwhile, Birney's 
name was suggested for the state legislature in Michigan. To make 
matters xet more complicated, a Democ:t;"atic convention nominated him 
for this position. The Whig newspapers shouted that a bargain had 
8 
been made between Birney and Polk to defeat Clay. Birney did say that 
6naily National Intelligencer, April 27, 1844. 
7 Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in~ South (Washington: 
American Historical Association, 1913), p. 112. 
8 
Fladeland, James Gillespie Birney, p. 242. 
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he was not supporting either Polk or Clay. Birney thought both ha~ . 
repudiated the unity of the nation. He added that as Clay was a leader 
of his party to a great~r extent than Polk, Clay should be feared 
9 
most. 
Later, a letter purportedly written by Birney to Jerome B. Garland 
of Kentucky supposedly contained proof of these charges. It appeared 
that Birney was a Democrat! However, this letter proved to be a for-
gery. Yet the damage to the liberty party's campaign was done. Their 
press, thoroughly unprepared for this charge, did not have time to 
10 
prove the letter a forgery, and all they could do was to deny it. 
As a result, Liberty party members contended they lost the votes 
of many antislavery men to the Whig party, and Birney ID.qintained that 
the Whigs forged the letter to attain that end. After the election 
the Whig-Liberty antagonism continued. The Liberty men would not 
wholeheartedly join any Whigs until the Whig abolitionists of Massa-
chusetts bolted their party's convention in 1848. 
While the nation's anti-slavery voters pondered the merits of the 
Whig and Liberty candidates, the Whig party struggled to maintain co-
hesion between its Northern and Southern members. Many prominent 
Southern Whigs failed to support Clay because of his "Raleigh Letter." 
For the most part, however, Clay received the endorsement of the Whigs 
in the South. Many of these Whigs thought that annexation of Texas 
would cause a migration of slave owners to Texas and thereby render 
slavery unprofitable in the older slave states • 
. 91bid., p. 244. 
lOibi'd., 245 6 PP• - • 
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In the election Southern Whigs were the champions of the Union; 
their slogan, "Union witho~t Texas rather than Texas without Union" 
rang pleasantly in Northern ears. However, Henry Clay was not elected. 
The election revealed the Whig's strength in the North. Clay did not 
receive the electoral votes of any states in the lower South, and it 
d h h Wh . k . h . S h ll Th" appeare tat t e ig party was wea int e entire out. is 
decrease of votes convinced many Southerners to abide by sectional 
interests, and it would be the votes of Southern Whigs which would make 
possible the passage of the joint resolution for the annexation of .. 
Texas. 
Polk won the election and interpreted his victory as a national 
mandate for the annexation of Texas. However, an analysis of the 
results proves that Polk's election was not a national referendum to 
annex Texas. Birney 1 s popular vote was 62,300 to 1,299,062 for Clay, 
and 1,337 ,243 for Polk. Had the LibeJ;"ty party joined the Whig par.ty, 
Clay might have won. The election returns in New York were the most 
significant; there Birney received 15,812 to 232,482 for Clay, and 
12 
237,588 for Polk. With only one-third of Birney's votes in New York, 
Clay could have won. Certainly Polk derived his narrow victory in New 
York from Van Buren's support. This unity did not last long, however, 
for Polk forgot his debts when he chose his cabinet. 
During December and January, Polk put together his cabinet and 
attempted to maintain cordial relations with the Van Burenites of New 
York. He offeJ;"ed Silas Wright the Treasury position; but Wright, newly 
11 
Cole, The Whig Party in the South, p. 115. 
12 
Fladeland, James Gillespie Birney, p. 246. 
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elected governor of New York, declined. Polk then requested the 
assistance of Wright and Van Buren in selecting the secretaries of 
state and of treasury. Both men agree that Benjamin F. Butler should 
be secretary of state and Azariah C. Flagg secretary of the treasury. 
On January 30, Polk traveled to Nashville convinced that Flagg would be 
his secretary of the treasury. But western Democrats feared that a 
Van Burenite in the Treasury Department would fill all the Western 
13 
land offices with appointees hostile to Cass. The Calhoun and Cass 
forces of the Democratic party thus threatened open revolt should Flagg 
become secretary of the treasury. In the end, Robert J. Walker of 
Mississippi received the post. After Polk announced his cabinet, he ac-
quired. solid opposition from within the Democratic party in New York. 
These Democrats in New York, led by Van Buren, came to be known as 
Barnburners, and in 1848 they bolted their national convention. 
John Quincy Adams saw the Democratic celebrations in New York when 
it was learned that Polk had won. Torchlights lined the streets of the 
city and at midnight Adams awoke to the sound of twenty-six guns. The 
next day he wrote, "It is the victory of the slavery element in the 
14 
constitution of the United States." On March 1, 1845, three days 
before the James K. Polk inauguration, President John Tyler signed the 
joint resolution for the annexation of the state of Texas. To many 
Northerners this act seemed to verify Adams' statement--that the 
slavery element had won. 
13 
Charles Sellers, James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843-1846 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Prin~eton University Press, 1966), p. 195. 
14charles Francis Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Qui)cy Adams 
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Texans long had been seeking this annexation. In 1837, the Presi-
dent, Sam Houston, tried to solve the various problems of the newly 
independent Republic of Texas by asking the United States to annex 
Texas. President Martin Van Buren rejected the proposition, considering 
it an unconstitutional act. By 1843, however, rumors were circulating 
through the United States of the second World Anti-Slavery Convention 
and of its resolutions toward abolishing slavery in Texas and the pre-
vention of the annexation of Texas to the United States. Later, Lord 
Aberdeen, British Foreign Secretary, stated in Parliament and in a 
letter to Ashbell Smith, the Texan minister to Great Britain, that 
Britain did hope for abolition in Texas. In subsequent letters to John 
C. Calhoun, then Secretary of State of the United States, Aberdeen 
reiterated this statement and said that Great Britain did not intend 
to interfere in Texan affairs. Calhoun did not acknowledge Aberdeen's 
explanation and along with a treaty for the annexation of Texas he sent 
selected dispatches which would convince the Senate of a British plot. 
to abolish slavery in Texas and to prevent the annexation of Texas to 
the United States. 
While the Senate challenged Calhoun's evidence of British 
complicity, the House heard speeches by Southern members favoring 
the treaty. Finally, on May 21, 1844, Joshua Giddings of Ohio obtained 
the floor late in the day. Gazing directly at his audience, he attacked 
the idea of annexation of Texas. He sometimes groped for words, for he 
was not a polished speaker. Despite this deficiency and without notes, 
Giddings presented five reasons why Texas should not be annexed. He 
thought it unfair that citizens of the United States would be 
taxed to pay the debts of Texans. If Texas were annexed, he claimed, 
25 
a possibility existed of a war with Mexico, Great aritain, and perhaps 
France. The United States would then be in a position of providing 
an army to protect slaveholders. Also, if Texas joined the Union, the 
North and the West might lose power in Congress and they would have 
neither protective tariffs nor internal improvements. Furthermore, he 
asserted the United States Constitution contained no guarantee for the 
15 
maintenance of slavery. Implicit within Gidding's speech were the 
two major challenges to the Whig party and their abolitionist allies: 
a contest between the agrarian West and South and the industrialized 
East and Great Lakes regions in Congress, and the expansion and 
16 
strengthening of slavery. However, the Senate rejected the treaty, 
and the country awaited the results of the election of 1844 to deter-
mine a solution for the dilemma of Texas. 
Accepting the election of Polk as a mandate from the people for 
the annexation of Texas, and desiring credit for his administration, 
Tyler signed the joint resolution of Congress for the annexation of 
Texas on March 1, 1845, three days before Polk's inauguration. On 
February 27, the Senate amended a House bill for annexation so that 
Texas could be invited to join the Union either by joint resolution 
or by a new treaty. The next day the House approved the amendment. 
Polk had suggested that the Senate amendment be added to the House 
resolution to induce the followers of Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri 
to accept the joint resolution. Benton and his disciples feared that 
a war with Mexico would result and decided that a new treaty might pro-
15congressional Globe, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, pp. 704-705. 
16Norman A. Graebner (ed.), Manifest Destiny (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968), p. xxxiii. 
17 
vide the necessary time to secure Mexican approval. 
Yet Tyler, and not Polk, decided the method of annexation. Cal-
26 
houn led Tyler to believe that Britain was trying to prevent annexation 
and to promote the abolition of slavery in Texas. The joint resolution 
which Tyler signed provided for the annexation of Texas as a state 
(or states) when the people of Texas had drawn up a constitution pro-
viding for a republican form of government suitable to Congress. 
Texas' boundary problem and its defense would be the responsibility of 
the United States, while Texas would retain its debt and all its public 
lands. It also provided that with the consent of Texans, four addition-
al states could be created from the territory of Texas, and that terri-
tory north of the Missouri Compromise line would be closed to slavery. 
Finally the resolution set the deadline for a Texas constitution to be 
18 
presented to Congress as no later than January 1, 1846. 
Whigs voted for this joint resolution. The election of 1844 had 
caused many Southern Whigs to re-evaluate their positions. Comparing 
the election of 1844 with the election of 1840, the Southern Whigs found 
that they cut their majority in the black belt and yet had not appealed 
19 
to the Democratic backcountry either. That convinced these Southern 
Whigs to vote their sectional interests rather than support the national 
Whig party position. They knew that the Texas issue had cut their 
majority. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia and Milton Brown of 
17Kinley J. Brauer, Cotton versus Conscience: Massachusetts Whig 
Politics and Southwestern Expansion, 1843-1848 (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 105. 
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Tennessee agreed it was necessary for Southern Whigs to support the 
annexation of Texas. With the assistance of eight other Southern 
Whigs, the resolution was carried in the House. Simultaneously, in· 
the Senate, Ephraim H. Foster of Tennessee presented the joint reso-
lution for annexation. Later, he refused to support it when the Senate 
added the amendment to permit the president to secure annexation by 
treaty if he so desired. Most of the Whigs concurred with Foster's 
refusal. They thought this amendment failed to recognize the superior-
ity of the legislature's treaty-making power. Nevertheless, three 
Southern Whigs provided pivotal votes that made possible passage of 
the resolution on the final ballot. 
Whig journals cautiously avoided offending the South on this 
matter. Meanwhile, the abolitionists' newspaper, Th€ Liberator, 
soundly denounced the South. Appealing to the pecuniary interests of 
the North, the organ assailed the ''wantonly disrespectful'' acts of the 
South in regard to the rights and feelings of free states. 20 By 
illegal maneuvering it asserted, the South had legislated a burden 
on the North. Texas was a land with a population equal only to three 
or four of the largest counties in Massachusetts: yet should Texas 
become a state it might, through its newly acquired legislative powers, 
swallow the North. Texas also was the land of little money; money 
scarcity would not promote importation of Northern products. Texas 
would grow only because markets shifted from the South to the new 
state. The North thus could not profit by the annexation of Texas. 
Texas was the land which could only bring bankruptcy to Northern 
20The Liberator, June 27, 1845. 
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pocketbooks and national morals. 21 
The annexation of Texas alarmed the Whigs, but for different rea-
sons, Charles Sumner, representing the abolitionist Whig sentiment, 
wrote in his memoir, " ••• history records no baser transaction than the 
22 
annexation of Texas." Failing to prevent the incorporation of Texas 
into the Union, a small number of Whig abolitionists began to campaign 
against admission of a. Texas with a pro-slavery constitution. The 
majority of the Whigs shuddered at this maneuver. In New England the 
influence of the manufacturers and the capitalists dominated politics, 
and to them the issue of paramount importance was the maintenance of 
the protective tariff of 1842--and not Texas. If the Whigs succeeded, 
party unity with their Southern neighbors needed to be maintained. The 
slavery issue could only embarrass the Southern Whigs and perhaps pre-
vent a Whig restoration to power in the approaching elections. To these 
men, material questions controlled national politics. 
For the Conscience Whigs, however, the time had arrived for the 
triumph of moral principle over party politics. Charles Francis Adams, 
son of John Quincy Adams and a senator in the Massachusetts legislature, 
led a group of anti-slavery Whigs who insisted that the resolution of 
Congress had only allowed Texas to form a government and apply for 
statehood. Massachusetts was the model state for an experiment of 
conscience. Within that state's Whig party there existed those who 
opposed slavery, but only so long as it did not split the party or harm 
their business to do so. And there were those who opposed slavery 
21Ibid., April 18, 1845. 
22 
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without hesitations; these were young men--most of them in their 
h . . 23 t irties. Prior to the passage of the joint resolution, Adams 
and his fellow Whig abolitionists attended conventions which pro-
tested the annexation of Texas. One of these conventions at Faneuil 
Hall in Boston resulted in a committee of correspondence to communicate 
in emergencies with the opponents of annexation in all states. 
This committee consisted of Stephen C. Phillips, a Salem merchant 
and shipowner; Charles Allen, a former Whig member of the legislature 
and Judge of the Court of Common Pleas; and Charles Francis Adams. 
The connnittee decided that the emergency had arrived with the joint 
resolution of Congress. However, little resulted until the fall of 
1845. At that time the "Young Whigs" called for a meeting open to all 
who opposed annexation. Adams greatly influenced the Texas Committee's 
preparations for another convention at Faneuil Hall. That committee 
appointed Adams, Samuel E. Sewell, an abolitionist of the Liberty 
party, and Sumner to draw up the resolutions. Sewell and Sumner pre-
pared separate drafts for these resolutions; however, Adams thought 
they were too extreme. Adams, assisted by John Gorham Palfrey, who 
was a former Unitarian minister and a past editor of the North American 
Review, composed a new set which Adams presented to the Texas Committee 
the day before the convention. The committee accepted his resolutions. 
On the evening of November 4, 1845, two thousand people attended 
24 
the convention at Faneuil Hall. Outside the hall, lightning illumi-
nated the sky; rain and hail pattered and thumped against the building; 
23 Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 103. 
24oscar Sherwin, Prophet of Liberty: the Life and Times of Wendell 
Phillips (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958)~ 176. 
and the thunder rolled and cracked. The Liberator sympathetically 
described the meeting ,;md stated that the weather was "emblematic of 
25 the present moral and political aspects of the country." The Demo-
30 
cratic newspapers replied that the weather was an expression against 
the traitorous undertakings within the Boston hall. 26 The assembly made 
Adams chairman, and he spoke at the opening of the meeting. Adams 
stressed unity, energy, and moderation as guides in their continuing 
struggle. Palfrey followed Adams and presented the resolutions which 
the Texas Committee had approved. The resolutions denounced slavery, 
slaveholders, and the annexation of Texas. Furthermore, the members 
of the corrnnittee had resolved that Massachusetts would continue to 
resist the slaveocracy which conspired to annex Texas to extend the 
bounds of slavery. They knew that Massachusetts' Congressmen would 
27 
resist that "fatal measure to the utmost at every stage." 
Sumner spoke after Palfrey, and Adams' group feared that Sumner 
would again denounce annexationists too veheminently. He did not. 
His address stressed unity and moderation as had Adams'. He did not 
think the convention radical, for he said it was "to preserve existing 
supports of Freedom; it is to prevent the violation of free institu-
. . h . . 1 . . 1 1128 tions int eir vita princip es. For these reasons he thought the 
convention was conservative. According to Sumner, they assembled 
25The Liberator, November 21, 1845. 
26 
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without "distinctions to party;" they did not want to interfere with 
any institution of Southern states, but they did not want to involve 
29 
Massachusetts in conunitting a wrong: 
God forbid that the votes and voices of Northern freemen 
should help to bind anew the fetters of the slave! God 
forbid that the lash of the slave-dealer should descend 
by any sanction from New England! God forbid that the 
blood which spurts from the lacerated, quivering flesh 
of the slave should soil the hem of the white garments 
of Massachusetts!30 
After making this speech, Sumner became famous nationally. 
Abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, 
31 
and the Reverend W. H. Channing frightened the Whigs when they proposed 
disunion resolutions. Nevertheless, the meeting remained quite moder-
ate in its course. The Liberty party, represented by H. B. Stanton, 
helped the Whigs to avoid friction and bad publicity. This meeting 
resulted in the needed stimulus that was to provoke similar gatherings 
in the Northeast in rapid succession throughout 1845. Speeches were 
made; pamphlets were written; and editorials were printed on behalf of 
the antislavery cause. Palfrey and his friends attended many of these 
meetings. They fidgeted uncomfortably when abolitionists damned the 
31 
Constitution and countinenced disunion. · Soon the Texas Conunittee 
appeared to be dominated by extreme abolitionist ideas. 
The regular Whig party leaders in Massachusetts discounted the 
actions of the abolitionists. They considered the question of annexa-
29rbid., pp. 152, 155. 
30rbid., p. 157. 
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tion settled. Abbott Lawrence and Nathan Appleton represented the Whig 
regulars and the textile lords. Henry Wilson attempted to push anti-
annexation resolutions through the state senate, but the Whig leaders 
blocked him. E. Rockwood Hoar spiritedly replied, "It is as much the 
duty of Massachusetts to pass resolutions in favor of the rights of 
man as in the interests of cotton. 1132 This led to the application of 
the name of "Cotton Whigs".to those who opposed adopting a distinctly 
anti-slavery policy by their party. Later, in early 1846, Hoar would 
be responsible for the new name for the Whig abolitionists--the 
"Conscience Whigs." 
On December 16, the House in Washington passed a resolution to 
admit Texas as a state, and on December 22, the Senate approved it. 
The vote was not along sectional lines of both houses, and Democrats 
as well as Whigs were in favor of it. Then on December 29, Polk signed 
the measure. The next day the Texas Committee had its final meeting. 
Adams denounced Appleton and Lawrence and those congressmen who had 
supported admission. However, he noted that no Northern Whig had 
voted for the measure. The abolitionists of the Texas Committee 
charged that Adams tried to protect the Whigs by that remark. Adams 
changed the wording, and the committee accepted the report and dis-
solved itself. The committee's activities had lasting importance. 
Massachusetts Whiggery split and the Conscience Whigs spread the idea 
of moral politics over party politics to other states. 
The dissolution of the Texas Committee left the Whig activists 1n 
a quandry. How could they continue to play a role in the anti-slavery 
32p· M · d L f Ch 1 S 106 1.erce, emo1.r an etters o ar es umner, p. · · • 
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question? The Abolitionists' factions had many journals to present. 
their views to the public. Yet the Whig Abolitionists had none. Whig 
journals generally ignored the slavery issue. Early in 1846 Charles 
Francis Adams negotiated for a daily means of public expression for the 
newly dubbed "Conscience Whigs." Adams, Palfrey, and Phillips pur-
chased the Boston Whig. Adams' first editorial stated that existing 
Boston papers were not true to Whig principles, for they dealt too 
much with property rights rather than the question of what was right. 33 
They bought the Whig on May 28, 1846, and by that time the Whig abo-
litionists had a new issue on which to expound their theories--the 
Mexican War. 
The Democratic plank for the re-annexation of Texas and reoccupa-
tion of Oregon resulted in the eventual division within the Democratic 
party as well as within the Whig party. Thus the election of 1844 and 
of James K. Polk presented a direct question--should the political 
parties abide by national interests or sectional ties? The Southern 
Whigs resolved themselves to represent the South. The election returns 
proved that the Whig party was strongest in the North; therefore why 
should they hurt their chances in future elections by upholding Northern 
principles? While the Whigs concerned themselves with Texas, the Demo-
crats in the Northwest called for completion of the bargain which had 
been made in 1844--the reoccupation of Oregon. 
The day after Polk signed the bill admitting Texas, the clash 
between Northwesterners and Southerners in the Democratic party 
erupted. Senator Edward Hannegan of Indiana declared that Texas and 
33 Gatell, John Gorham Palfrey, p. 129. 
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Oregon were "nursed and cradled in the same cradle--the Baltimore 
Convention. 1134 Furthermore, he charged that "There was not a moment's 
hesitation, until~Texas was admitted; but the moment she was admitted, 
the peculiar friends of Texas turned, and were doing all they could to 
35 strangle Oregon!" If the United States risked war with Mexico when 
Texas was annexed, he asked, why did the government not do the same 
withOregon? Northwesterners questioned the hesitation of the adminis-
tration on the Oregon territory, while Calhoun led a faction of Demo-
crats who feared that Great Britain would go to war if a compromise 
could not· be reached on the boundary between Oregon and Canada. Polk 
agreed with Calhoun and in June, 1846, a war with England was averted 
by a settlement of the Oregon boundary at the forty-ninth parallel. 
The anti-slavery elements of the Democratic party attacked this 
action by the administ:ration and used it to eliminate the more radical 
elements from President Polk's party •. ·The. Van Burenites who had been 
anti-Texas denounced Polk for his treachery. They stated that Polk was 
willing to go to war for a boundary which would extend slavery, but was 
not willing to go to war for a boundary which would extend freedom. 
Later, in August of 1846, when Polk needed appropriations for the war 
with Mexico, he became alarmed and disgruntled by Northern Democrats 
who voted against the measure in retaliation for the Oregon settlement. 
By 1846 truly national political parties did not exist. Due to 
the duplicity of the leaders in the Democratic and Whig parties, 
34congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 110. See also 
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sectionalism had arisen. Those who thought they had been duped by both 
parties joined under a common cause--opposition to slavery, and they 
expressed this opposition in Congress during the war with Mexico. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MEXICAN WAR 
Near the time of his inauguration, president-elect James K. Polk 
related to George Bancroft, who later would be secretary of navy, that 
one of the great measures of the Polk administration would be the ac-
1 
quisition of California. After assuming office Polk sent John Slidell 
to Mexico to arrange for the purchase of California. The president of 
Mexico, Jos~ Joaquim de Herrera, seemed moderate, and it appeared 
possible that differences with the United States could be settled by 
diplomacy. Polk thought Mexico, which had not paid its debts to 
American citizens, might consider trading these claims for California. 
Upon his arrival in Mexico, however, Slidell found the Mexican govern-
ment not so eager to settle disputes. In fact, Herrera refused to see 
him. Despite Herrera's action, a popular uprising threw him out of 
office late in 1845, whereupon General Mariano Paredes replaced Herrera 
and took a more aggressive position towards the United States. 
The annexation of Texas to the United States in part triggered a 
war with Mexico. Differences had arisen from a disputed boundary--the 
United States claimed the Rio Grande as the southern and western 
boundary of Texas while Mexico demanded that the actual boundary of 
Texas was the Nueces River. Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor and 
1 
Charles Sellers, James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843-1846 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princ-;to~iversity Press, 1966), p. 213. 
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his troops to move to the mouth of the Nueces River when Texas was 
officially annexed. With the failure of the Slidell mission and the 
subsequent overthrow of Herrera, Polk forsaw possibilities of a con-
flict with the Mexican government over the Texan boundary. To protect 
the boundary claims, Polk instructed Taylor to move to the Rio Grande. 
Paredes made a similar move and sent Mexican troops northward. On 
April 23 American dragoons were attacked north of the Rio Grande. 
Polk received word of this attack, and with the help of secretary 
of state James Buchanan and secretary of the navy Bancroft, the Presi-
dent set to work on a war message. On May 11, 1846, Polk requested 
that Congress recognize a state of war owing to the Mexican invasion of 
American territory. He did not ask for a declaration of war--merely 
a recognition that war existed and an appropriation of the means for 
persecuting it. 
In the lower chamber the administration's supporters rallied 
around the President's message to protect it from detractors. The 
House dissolved into a Committee of the Whole to discuss the matter. 
A few Southerners objected to what was termed an administrative usurpa-
tion of congressional powers--Congress alone could declare war. Robert 
Winthrop, a Massachusetts Whig in the House, asked for the official 
correspondence to be read. The supporters of the administration re-
jected this proposal. They brushed aside all opposition under the 
operation of the previous question and amended the bill into an act 
to prosecute the existing war between the United States and Mexico. 
Also in defense of Polk, they supported the addition of the preamble in 
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the President's statement on Mexican invasion. 2 A motion to strike 
the preamble fell, despite the support of nearly every Whig member. 3 
In the flurry which ensued, the bill passed with the controversial pre-
amble. It also contained a provision for raising fifty thousand volun-
teers and an appropriation for ten million dollars to prosecute and 
4 
quickly terminate the war. Only fourteen congressmen opposed the 
measure; John Quincy Adams headed the list, and thirteen Whig aboli-
tionists followed his lead. 5 
The Senate moved more slowly. They also dispensed with the reading 
of the documents, but they d_id order the documents printed for their 
members' use. Calhoun obtained the floor and stated that no war 
existed--only hostilities arising from an invasion of American soil. 
He had heard Qf the hostilities previous to the President's message 
and had tried to organize a peace coalition. He reiterated that the 
President was empowered to repel .an invasion but not to make war. The 
senator from South Carolina further stated that the question was too 
2This preamble caused much debate in Congress. It stated that the 
war was in existence by an "act of the Republic of Mexico~-" Congres-
sional Globe, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 782-795. 
3 
Horace Greeley, The American Conflict (2 vols., Hartford: o. D. 
Case and Company, 18&5), I, p •. 187. 
4 
Alfred Hoyt Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 
1846-1848 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 106. 
5cong~essional Globe, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 795. Those who voted 
against the bill were John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, George Ashmun 
of Massachusetts, Henry Young Cranston of Rhode Island, Charles Vernon 
Culver of Pennsylvania, Columbus Delano of Ohio, Joshua Reed Giddings 
of Ohio, Joseph Grinnell of Massachusetts, Joseph Mosley Root of Ohio, 
Luther Severance of Maine, John Strohm of Rhode Island, Charles 
Hudson of Massachusetts, D. P. King of Massachusetts, Daniel Rose 
Tilden of Ohio, and Joseph Vance of Ohio. 
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grave not to be considered calmly and deliberately. 6 
Despite attempts to rush the bill through the Senate, the members 
divided the message between the committees on Foreign Relations and 
Military Affairs. The following morning the Committee on Military 
Affairs approved the House bill. Before the Senate met at noon, a Demo-
cratic caucus concurred with what the House had done. Immediately, 
the bill came before the full Senate for a vote. Calhoun would vote 
for supplies and men to repel invasion, but he would not vote a decla-
ration of war without seeing the documents. The Committee on Foreign 
Relations agreed with the military committee, and all efforts to proceed 
more slowly were voted down. In fact, all protests against declaring 
war without knowledge of facts met with shouts of disapproval. Finally, 
when a vote was taken, the Senate passed the bill by a majority of 40 
to 2. 7 
Those who voted directly against the bill in both houses were 
Whigs. Except for those sixteen, the mass of Whig members voted for 
the bill. Although the majority of the Whigs thought the war had be-
gun unjustly and unconstitutionally, they construed their votes to 
mean only a direct aid to those soldiers who were engaging in battles. 
And their party did not formally condemn their actions. However, Henry 
Clay, then in private life, said that "no earthly consideration would 
have ever tempted or provoked me to vote for a bill with a palpable 
falsehood stamped on its face. 118 
6congressional Globe, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 783. 
7 Ibid. , p. 804. 
8 
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The Daily National Intelligence, a Whig organ of wide circulation, 
expressed strong disapproval. It forsaw the day when Whigs would re-
h . . 9 gret t eir actions. Excuses abounded. Thomas Corwin, Senator from 
Ohio, voted for the bill to save "our little army from its perilous 
position. 1110 He had no idea that the "little armylil would invade 
Mexico. Later, he regretted his vote. Robert Toombs, a Representa-
tive from Georgia, reasoned that if the Whigs did not vote for the 
• 
bill the President and his party would make political capital of it. 11 
He did not want to be on the wrong side of what appeared to be a popu-
lar war. Although Giddings voted against it, he said that the first 
vote was given under "peculiar circumstances;" the Whigs had not enough 
time to compare views or to discuss the propriety of the matter. They 
were told that American troops were in need so'.:they responded on first 
reactions. 12 The National Intelligencer stated that "Congress went to 
war on deficient information. 1113 The paper questioned the details 
which the Chief Executive had not given Congress or the people. What 
if the Mexican government had immediately resolved upon war without 
information or avowal or disapproval from the United States when 
Commodore ap. Catesby Jones in 1842 had captured the Mexican part of 
Monterrey on the Pacific, it asked. 14 
9oaily National Intelligencer, May 16, 1846. 
lOC · 1 Gl b 28 C 1 S 543 44 ongressiona o e, ong., ess., pp. - • 
11Ibid., PP• 140-41. 
12Ibid., 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 58. 
130 ·1 ai y 
14Ibid. 
National Intelligencer, May 16, 1846. 
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Yet in its early phases, the war seemed extremely popular. Men 
rushed to volunteer. People reacted out of patriotism for their coun-
try and out of a desire for revenge for Mexican outrages and insults 
to their country. The Democratic party could use the war to gain pres-
tige and unity. They could offer offices and appointments while 
businessmen would grow rich. N:ews of Taylor's victories aroused further 
enthusiasm. 
Suddenly, that enthusiasm waned. Having acknowledged the war, the 
Whigs began to question the President and his objectives. The Twenty-
Ninth Congress was volatile. Numerous rumors circulated about Pol~s 
true purpose. The National Intelligencer challenged them. If Polk 
was sincere when he said in his Proclamation to the People of Mexico 
that the object of the war was to overthrow tyrants, why did he want 
to negotiate with President Paredes? Polk stated in the same procla-
mation that the object of the war was to obtain indemnity for claims. 
The Whig journal derided Polk for spending money to obtain money. In 
his speech on May 11 to Congress, he had said his object was to repel 
an invasion and to defend American territory; yet Congressmen from 
both parties questioned if this were indeed American territory. 15 The 
Whigs bombasted the President for "starting" the war, yet they con-
tinued to vote for appropriations to sustain the war--a very peculiar 
position indeed! 16 A few Whigs stood with Giddings when he stated that 
this was a war of conquest. Therefore, if they voted for war appro-
15 
Thomas Hart Benton (Democrat) and Abraham Lincoln (Whig) doubted 
American territorial claims. 
16Daily National Intelligencer, May 16, 1846. 
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priation~ he said, they would certainly have a wicked part in it. 17 
The split between Whig abolitionists and the Whig party widened. No-
where was this division clearer than in Massachusetts. 
The main body of Massachusetts' delegation voted against the 
war, while Winthrop and one other colleague voted for it. The Whig 
abolitionists held Winthrop responsible for breaking the unity of the 
Massachusetts delegation, 18 while Whig politicians and capitalists 
apologized for him by saying that peculiar and difficult circumstances 
justified an honest difference of opinion. 19 They did not shield his 
vote behind a facade of patriotism and public duty, for this would have 
reflected upon his Conscience colleagues and would have harmed party 
harmony. 
Reluctantly, Sumner criticized Winthrop's vote. Yet Winthrop 
belonged to a constituency with which he was eminently in accord; 
society in Boston was "conservative, delighted in refined manners and 
liberal culture, shrank from moral reforms and from any agitation which 
was likely to bring the masses to the front," and it was allied with 
the manufacturers. 20 Winthrop himself never offered any apology for 
his position. He voted for reasonable supplies so that the war could 
be quickly ended and settled honorably. Furthermore, he denounced any 
h h f . . . f M . 21 t oug to acquiring territory rom exico. Charles Francis Adams 
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admonished Winthrop in the WhiS for his treachery to the Massachusetts' 
people. After a few of his friends requested him to take part in the 
discussion, Sumner began writing articles anonymously. 
In these, Sumner admired Winthrop's character and attainment, and 
he stated that he felt great pain in condemning Winthrop's public 
action. 22 Yet on moral grounds, he challenged the right of a repre ... 
sentative to affix his name to a legislative falsehood. The aboli-
tionist Whig implied Winthrop feared "to be found alone in the company 
23 
of truth." Later, Sumner wrote, "Blood! blood! is on the hands of 
24 the representative from Boston." Greatly incensed by this attack 
on his public morality, Winthrop declared Sumner would never have 
the service of the blood-stained hands. Suniner thereupon became a 
social outcast in the city of Boston. Aside from the question of 
slavery, the two elements of the party directly opposed each other on 
the war. Voting on appropriation bills made this fact apparent. The 
two factions radically disagreed on questions of morals, politics, 
25 
and national honor. 
Most Democrats defended the war, although some Northern members 
of that party thought the President had thwarted or manipulated them 
on one issue after another. The Northwestern Democrats felt they had 
been deceived by the Calhounites and Polk on the Oregon question. 
22Ibid., P• 115. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid., P• 117. 
25Ibid.·, P• 118. 
And in New York, the Van Burenites saw the grip Polk had in under-
mining their positions by federal patronage. 
During the last-minute, hectic business of Congress on August 8, 
1846, a special message from the President was delivered. Polk asked 
for an appropriation of two million dollars to be used to negotiate 
a treaty with Mexico. He thought the United States should pay a fair 
equivalent to Mexico for any concessions. The House discussed Polk's 
message until lunch and then reconvened at five o'clock. 
While having lunch, various Northern Democrats concurred on this 
plan of action. They decided to attach a rider to the appropriations 
amendment prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude in any terri-
tory acquired from Mexico as a result of the war. Upon returning 
from dinner, James Thompson of Pennsylvania, Jacob Brinkerhoff of 
Ohio, and David Wilmot of Pennsylvania huddled in the rear of the 
chamber to decide on tactics. They selected Wilmot to introduce the 
amendment because he was in better standing with the administration 
and the Southern Democrats. 26 The Whigs challenged the Democrats to 
propose such an amendment before Wilmot attained the floor. Thus it 
was the Whigs who opened the subject. 27 After Wilmot presented the 
rider, the House debated for two hours and adopted it by a vote of 83 
to 64. The amended two-million appropriation bill was passed by a 
vote of 85 to 79. The parties divided along sectional lines. The 
free-state Democrats supported the bill 52 to 4 while the slave-state 
Democrats opposed it by Oto 50. Two Southern Whigs voted for the 
26charles Buxton Going, David Wilmot: Free-Sailer (New York: 
D. Appleton and Company, 1924), p. 138. 
27congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 1210-~215. 
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bill, while eight free-state Wh~gs voted against it. 28 The quiet, 
stout, light-haired David Wilmot awoke the next day a famous man, 
and the amendment became known as the Wilmot Proviso. 29 
On August 10 the Senate got the two-million bill only thirty or 
forty minutes before the mandatory adjournment at noon. A movement 
to strike the Wilmot Proviso gained momentum, but John Davis of 
45 
Massachusetts secured the floor and began to discuss the whole matter. 
Alabama's Senator Dixon Lewis interrupted Davis several times in an 
attempt to strike the proviso. Davis would not yield the floor but 
promised to finish in time for Lewis to present his resolution. Lewis 
protested that the House might adjourn any minute. Still Davis would 
not yield. 
In the House everyone watched the clock. Winthrop rose and stated 
that the House clock was seven or eight minutes faster than the Senate 
clock. By which clock would they adjourn? The Speaker replied, by the 
House clock. Many voices cried, "Twelve o'clock, twelve o'clock." They 
adjourned and the news sped to the Senate. Lewis stated that it was 
needless to proceed--the House had adjourned. Thus Polk's two-million 
bill died. 30 
Polk, thoroughly disappointed, wrote in his diary, ''What connec-
tion slavery had with making peace with Mexico it is difficult to 
conceive. 1131 The Northern Democrats enjoyed Polk's defeat on this 
28Ibid., P• 1217. 
29oscar Sherwin, Prophet of Liberty: the Life and Times of Wendell 
Phillips (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958):-ii7 178. 
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matter, but the antislavery Whigs who had voted against the Mexican 
war bill felt even more gratified. 
The Wilmot Proviso became the topic of conversation throughout the 
country during the summer and fall of 1846. Congress reconvened in 
December, and Polk sent another message requesting three-million dol-
lars. Again Wilmot's colleagues suggested he introduce the proviso. 
The time came on February 17, 1847, when the House sat as a Committee 
of the Whole, but the antislavery De~ocrats found Wilmot's seat empty. 
Hannibal Hamlin of Maine replaced Wilmot and presented the amendment. 
The House adopted the proviso by 115 to 106. Wilmot entered the 
chambers, red-faced and perspiring, while many anti-slavery Democrats 
glared at him. Later, in the cloakroom Wilmot explained that he had 
received a note from the President to come to the White House immedi-
ately. Wilmot believed that the President had called him deliberately 
to detain him--and in so doing, defeat the proviso. 32 However, the 
Wilmot Proviso faced great difficulty in the Senate. 
Although the proviso never was passed, it cut across party lines 
and became a periodic assertion of principle for antislavery factions 
within both parties. It made differences more noticeable in the Whig 
and Democratic parties. Southern Whigs united solidly with Southern 
Democrats to oppose the measure, and with the help of Northern men 
with Southern principles they succeeded. The Whig party danced awk-
wardly on its tiptoes to obtain some form of party unity--for the mid-
term elections were drawing nearer. 
To avoid the issue, Southern Whigs declared hostility to the 
32H. Draper Hunt, Hannibal Hamlin.of Maine (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1969), p. 40. 
acquisition of any territory as a result of the war. In the House, 
Alexander Stephen~ with Toombs' support, offered a resolution to this 
33 effect. The Senate chose the views of John M. Berrien of Georgia, 
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however. He called upon national patriotism to exclude this question. 
Northern Whigs cooperated to insure order. And prominent Whig Henry 
Clay stated, at the close of a speech at Lexington, Kentucky, that 
he disavowed any wish to acquire territory to propagate slavery. Even 
General Zachary Taylor thought the acquisition of any territory south 
of 36° 30' would endanger the permanency of the Union. 34 South Caro-
lina's Waddy Thompson, the late minister to Mexico, asserted that 
conditions of soil and climate would make slavery impossible in the 
d . 35 covete regions. Still, the Southern Whigs distrusted the Northern 
Whigs who had supported the Wilmot Proviso. Yet they restrained them-
selves because the presidential election in 1848 would require a united 
Whig party. 
Meanwhile, in 1846, the Conscience Whigs had fought their battles 
in Congress and in state conventions. The Conservative (or Cotton) 
Whigs in Massachusetts had sought to keep the supremacy of the tariff 
issue, while the Young Whigs had pushed to the front questions on 
slavery and the Mexican War. A conference was then held before the 
state convention. The conservatives had decided they needed a plat-
form which was broad enough to offend no one in the national Whig 
33 . 
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party. 
On September 23, the convention met in Faneuil Hall. The 
delegates seemed tense. The conservatives controlled the managers of 
the assembly, who arranged the business so that antislavery senti-
ments could be excluded. Scattered throughout the hall, the anti-
slavery Whigs called loudly for Sumner, and without formal permis-
sion, Sumner marched to the pla.tfo'rm. He demanded the Whig party sus-
tain the fundamental principles of human r;i.ghts and duty by amending 
the United States Constitution to allow further aggressive action 
against slavery. Cheers went up as the Young Whigs wildly applauded 
h . 'd 37 t 1s 1 ea. The Conservative Whigs found Sumner's suggestion repug-
48 
nant. After Sumner took his seat, Winthrop spoke. He dwelled upon the 
measures on which the Northern and Southern Whigs agreed. The two 
speeches vividly showed that sympathetic ties no longer existed between 
the Cotton and Conscience Whigs. 
While the platform was being considered, the antislavery forces 
proposed it be based on resolutions upholding their position on slavery. 
The small "island" of Conscience Whigs was further isolated by the 
request of Stephen C. Phillips. He asked for amendments which would 
make opposition to slavery the prime political duty of the Whig party. 
ld 1 h d h . . 1 d 38 Support wou go on y to men w o promote tat pr1nc1p e an purpose. 
Of course, this would offend the national Whigs, for it reeked of sec-
tionalism. As Phillips spoke, sullen countenances and angry insults 
36Pierce, Memoir, III, p. 122. 
37 Ibid., P• 123. 
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were exchanged. No one knew what would happen to Phillips' amendment. 
Then the door in the back of the hall flew open. Heads turned. 
Voices hushed. Everyone rose, with a loud cheer and prolonged applause. 
Daniel Webster entered Faneuil Hall led by a Conservative Whig, Abbott 
Lawrence. Slowly, Webster walked the length of the hall, delegates 
parting as he advanced. Webster's presence decided the fate of the 
amendment, for it was well known that his escort, Lawrence, was un-
friendly to Phillips' motion. After they voted and the amendment 
failed, Webster spoke briefly to inspire party enthusiasm. When he 
heard the outcome of the convention, John Quincy Adams concluded, 
"There are two divisions in the party, one based upon public princi-
ple, and the other upon manufacturing and cormnercial ;i.nterests. 1139 
Despite Whig differences, the party in the off-year elections of 
1846 gained control of the House by 117 to 110. Whig solidarity seemed 
even more important since the Whigs had a narrow majority. Winthrop 
arrived in Washington on December 2, 1846, for consultations on nomi-
nations for the Speakership. True to his former character, Winthrop 
said and did nothing to arm his foes with weapons against him. There-
fore, the party caucus elected him as their nominee. John Gorham Pal-
frey, a newly elected representative from Massachusetts and a Conscience 
Whig, determined to make Winthrop state his position towards the war 
and slavery. 
To do this he sent a note to Winthrop, but received the reply 
that no pledges would be given. By the day of the election at the 
capitol, the galleries, which were filled early, contained many people 
39charles Francis Adams, (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 
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who anticipated a conflict over the Speakership. On the first ballot 
Winthrop lacked three votes of the needed 108. Palfrey, Giddings, and 
New Hampshire's Amos Tuck gave their votes to others, and they pro-
ceeded to vote in this manner throughout the election, On the second 
ballot Winthrop gained one vote, and one member of the hall left, re-
ducing the required majority to 110. The third ballot resulted in 
Winthrop's election because of the departure of a South Carolinian. 
John Quincy Adams administered the oath of office, thereby causing a 
great embarrassment for his son, Charles Francis Adams. Palfrey's 
position against a fellow representative from Massachusetts showed the 
40 
independent course the Conscience Whigs had decided to take. 
Although the Whig abolitionists were unsuccessful in Massachusetts 
in the election of 1846, they did make progress in another state--New 
Hampshire. Whigs there joined the Independent Democrats and the 
Liberty men in electing John P. Hale of the state legislature as 
senator to the national Congress. In return for their support, the 
Whigs asked th~t Anthony Colby, a Whig, be selected governor. The 
newly formed alliance in the state legislature succeeded in fulfilling 
the bargain, and government of New Hampshire became decidedly anti-war 
and antislavery. Later, because of his success, Hale would be con-
sidered by the Liberty party as a potential candidate for the presi-
dency in 1848, but the Whig abolitionists had other plans for him. 
During the next year, 1847, Congress accomplished little--proviso 
men from both parties upset the plans of party managers. Anti-slavery 
4°Frank Otto Gatell, "Palfrey's Vote, The Conscience Whigs and 
the Election of Speaker Winthrop," New England Quarterly Vol. XXXI 
(September, 1958), p. 231. 
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speeches abounded, and Conscience Whigs found themselves agreeing more 
with the Proviso Democrats. Southern Whigs cooperated in restraining 
their violent utterances. Polk commented on the Thirtieth Congress 
in his diary when after half a session they had accomplished nothing 
41 
but arguments "on politics and slavery." 
By March 10, 1848, Conscience men lost their main subject of 
debate--the Mexican War. The status of slavery remained undetermined. 
However, upon the resolution of thanks to the officers, Giddings de-
clined, saying that the war had been unconstitutional and he would 
42 
not thank murderers. Most Whigs "trimmed their sails for public 
. 43 sentiment." They were thinking of the presidential election that 
year. The Mexican War had produced for them an excellent candidate, 
General Zachary Taylor. Conscience Whigs knew they would have to 
block his nomination; they would give their support to whichever candi-
date who would agree to the intent of the proviso. 
The issue of freedom or slavery in the new territories acquired 
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo remained the most important issue 
in the Thirtieth Congress. Previously, a proposition had been made 
in the Senate by Berrian that no land be acquired as a result of the 
war with Mexico. This soothed Northern and Southern Whigs. Winthrop 
presented this proposal in the House. The vote was by party rather 
than sectional, and Berrian's request died. Then in July, 1848, a 
compromise committee, headed by John M. Clayton, a Whig Senator from 
41 . Nevins, Polk, p. 186. 
42The Liberator, March 10, 1848. 
43Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict, p. 325. 
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Delaware, proposed to leave the question of slavery to the Supreme Court 
and prohibit territorial legislatures from acting on the subject. Most 
of the Northern Whigs in the Senate rejected the Clayton Compromise; 
44 
however, Southern Whigs cooperated and it passed. But in the House 
the compromise was shelved by Southern Whigs. Stephens, the leader 
of this movement, thought the court could only recognize the continu-
ancy of Mexican laws against slavery. Northern Whigs helped defeat 
the bill because they believed the Democrats could make political 
· h b . h 1 . 45 gains t ere yin t e next e ection. 
election year. 
44cole, The Whig Party, pp. 125-26. 
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And 1848 was above all, an 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FREE-SOIL PARTY 
Polk, as previously noted, had commented in his diary that the 
Thirtieth Congress accomplished nothing but argwnents "on politics and 
1 
slavery." However, Congress accomplished little on politics and 
slavery when compared to the activity outside their chambers. Through-
out the year 1847, the Liberty party, the Democratic party, and the 
Whig party sought potential candidates for the presidential elections 
in 1848. The subjects most often discussed were the annexation of 
Texas, the Mexican War, and the Wilmot Proviso. The Whig and Demo-
cratic parties tried to maintain cohesion, while the Liberty party 
found its existence hard to defend. However, the Whig abolitionists 
looked forward to a more elaborate combination of antislavery factions--
one similar to that which had elected John P. Hale to the Senate in 
1846. They succeeded in their plans, and the Free-soil party developed. 
At last the advice of Joshua Giddings, given in 1843, had been heeded--
the Whigs and Liberty men worked together in an election. 
The Liberty party began inquiring of Hale as early as the fall of 
1846 about the possibility of his accepting the Liberty party's nomi-
nation for the presidency. Hale grew uneasy and received these over-
tures coldly. He thought talk of nominations so long before the elec-
1 
The Liberator, March 10, 1848. 
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tion was premature, and he preferred to enter the Senate known as an 
independent rather than as an adherent of any one party. Yet by the 
summer of 1847, antislavery journals from Maine to Illinois were openly 
declaring in favor of a Liberty ticket headed by Hale. Sam Lewis and 
Salmon-P. Chase were most often mentioned for the vice-presidency. 
Finally the Liberty Party National Committee issued a call for a nomi-
nating convention to meet in Buffalo in October, 1847. 
Prominent Eastern Liberty men invited the Senator-elect to meet 
with them in Boston in July. Hale accepted the invitation so that he 
could make clear his position regarding the nomination. Before this 
July meeting, Hale sought the counsel of three Conscience Whigs: 
Charles Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, and John Gorham Palfrey. These 
men suggested that he decline all offers temporarily because they were 
thinking of a broader antislavery movement. On July 24, Hale met with 
the Liberty men and made it clear that he favored postponing the con-
vention until spring. In the conversation, however, Hale indicated 
that he agreed with the Liberty party in principle, and that he would 
f d f . . 2 not re use a rat nomination. 
Most of Hale's friends urged caution. Amos Tuck hoped for a 
broadly-based Northern coalition united behind Silas Wright of New 
York •. Charles Sumner tried to dissuade Hale, as did Ohio's Salmon P. 
Chase. Chase, a liberty man for more than six years, thought the 
Liberty party was dead and that the only chances for success in the 
election would be a national antislavery league. Many people stead-
fastly advised Hale to accept the Liberty nomination, however. John 
2Richard H. Sewell, John P. Hale and the Politics of Abolition 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ~ty Press,~65), p. 89. 
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Greenleaf Whittier enthusiastically plugged for Hale's candidacy, while 
Henry B. Stanton, Joshua Leavitt, and Lewis Tappan decided to nominate 
the reluctant Hale. 
The national Liberty party convention met at Buffalo, on October 
20, 1847. One hundred-forty regular delegates represented all Northern 
states, and some volunteer delegates and Liberty Leaguers attended the 
3 
meeting. All enjoyed equal privileges. They met in private confer-
ences and caucuses at hotels, while the full sessions were held in a 
large revival tent which had been brought from Ohio. First they de-
cided to write the platform, whereupon a struggle developed. The 
Liberty Leagueers demanded a declaration that slavery was illegal 
everywhere--even in the states. The "expedient" faction gasped, for 
Hale would never consent to run on such an aggressive platform. In-
stead, these delegates reconnnended and passed moderate resolutions 
calling for the exclusion of slavery from the territories, abolition 
of slavery in the District of Columbia, and repeal of the Fugitive 
4 
Slave Act of 1793. They then adjourned until the next day. 
Upon reconvening, the convention turned to nominations. Chase 
jumped to his feet and moved that no choice be made until spring. A 
great deal of discussion followed; but Stanton, Leavitt and Tappan won 
again. At first many Liberty men suspected Hale to be inadvisable as 
a nominee; however, Stanton, Leavitt, and Tappan praised him so highly 
that the delegates nominated him on the first ballot. Before ad-
journing, they selected Leicester King of Ohio as the vice-presidential 
3rbid., p. 92. 
4Ibid., P• 93. 
candidate. Hale waited two months before accepting. By that time, 
other antislavery movements appeared possible, and Hale added in his 
acceptance a note that should a broader-based antislavery coalition 
form, he would gladly step aside and support it. 5 Not all Liberty 
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men supported Hale, however; the presidential nominee of 1840 and 1844, 
James G. Birney, became very disgusted with Hale's nomination. "Our 
old Liberty party," he wrote, "is pretty much shattered to pieces by 
this ridiculous Hale movement. 116 
By that time the Democratic party likewise appeared to be shat~ 
tered. During a Democratic convention at Syracuse in September, 1847, 
the Hunkeri seized control. The Barnburners asked for acceptance of 
the Wilmot Proviso, and they were defeated. They cried fraud and 
called for a mass meeting at Herkimer on October 26 to consult as to 
future action. This meeting marked the beginning of an open revolt in 
New York against the Polk regime. David Wilmot addressed the meeting, 
and John Van Buren, son of the former President, presented the resolu-
tions. Basically their platform endorsed the Wilmot Proviso, and 
asserted that they would not vote for any candidate who supported the 
extension of slavery. 
In February, 1848, the Barnburners met at Utica and again repudi-
ated the Democratic organization. At this meeting they opened the way 
for a new Free-Soil party by choosing a rival set of delegates to the 
national convention in Baltimore. Three months later the Democratic 
5Ibid., P• 96. 
6nwight L. Dumond, (ed.), Letters 0£ James Gillespie Birney: 
1831-1857 (2 vols •. ; _Gloucester, Mass.: Peter.Smith, 1966), I, p. 1091. 
-- - • .'... - - .. ,,-:, . ....,:~~a·• 
7 
The Hunkers had been for Polk in 1844 and continued the support 
throughout Polk's administration. They rivaled Van Buren's control 
of New York state politics. 
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National Convention convened. The rivalry of the two New York dele-
gations became the immediate topic for debate in the Committee on 
Credentials. By the second day, no decision could be reached by the 
committee; therefore it stated that those who pledged themselves to 
support the party nominee would be accepted. The Barnburners refused 
while the Hunkers accepted, and the committee immediately recommended 
that the Hunkers be seated. The next day the wrangling resumed, how-
ever, lasting until the evening. At that time a resolution to seat both 
delegations and split the.vote passed by a majority of two. The Hunk-
ers protested, and the question was resolved when the Barnburners 
gathered their 
8 
forces and departed. 
The remaining delegates at the convention selected big, heavy-
jowled Lewis Cass of Michigan for the presidential nomination. At an 
evening session the same day, May 25, they nominated General William 
o. Butler of Kentucky for Vice-President. On the final day of the 
convention, they turned their attention to platform making. They re-
affirmed the resolutions of 1840 and 1844 and added new ones. The 
convention pronounced the Mexican War just and necessary; officers and 
men in the army were praised; and the achievements of Polk's administra-
tion were listed with a note of congratulations. 9 This convention 
brought no harmony to the party, however, for it had driven the New 
York radicals completely away. In 1844 Cass had run against Van Buren, 
and the Michigan Senator had been supported by the Hunkers in New York. 
With only a portion of the Cass' delegates Van Buren could have won the 
8charles M. Wiltse, John c. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), p. 362. 
9Ibid., P• 363. 
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Democratic nomination. Instead Polk had been elected with Cass' 
support. 
On returning from the convention the Barnburners paused in the 
City Hall Park in New York City for a meeting. They decided to act 
independently and to hold their own convention at Utica in June. At 
this gathering, they nominated Van Buren for president and Henry Dodge, 
a Democratic Senator from Wisconsin, for vice-president. However, 
Dodge politely declined because his state had accepted Cass' nomination. 
B. F. Butler headed the committee which wrote the platfonn--a standard 
Democratic document with the Wilmot Proviso added. The attendance 
bespoke of careful preparation, for delegates attended from Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
The Democrats in Washington received the news of this gathering and 
reacted to it strongly. Polk called it "a most dangerous attempt to 
organize geographical parties upon the slave question. It is more 
threatening to the Union than anything which has occurred since the 
meeting of the Hartford Convention in 1814. 111° Calhoun did not 
immediately support either Cass or Van Buren. He waited to see if 
sectional peace could be maintained by Congress; however, in late July 
the Clayton Compromise was defeated in the House, whereupon administra-
tion leaders in the Senate urged Polk to dismiss all officeholders 
who yielded allegiance to the Van Buren faction but Polk hesitated. 
While the Bfrnburners were preparing for their convention at 
Utica, the Whig convention met in Philadelphia on June 7 and their con-
vention proved almost as hectic as the Democratic convention at Balti-
lOAllan Nevins (ed.), Polk: The Diary of a President, 1845-1849 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952),~.-328. 
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more. Charles Sumner became a middleman between the Massachusetts 
Conscience Whigs and the national leaders of the political anti-
slavery campaign. He confidentially corresponded with Chase and 
Hale, both of whom wanted to fuse the antislavery elements of all 
parties into a new national organization. In New York, he frequently 
met with leaders of the Barnburners and he came to know them well, 
and Giddings was his source of the latest Washington gossip. Other Whig 
abolitionists became closely connected with the Barnburners, as did 
11 
Hale through correspondence; but Sumner did most of the writing. 
At the meeting of the Massachusetts state Whigs in Springfield 
in 1847, the Massachusetts conservatives and the Conscience Whigs 
had agreed to support Daniel Webster for the presidency. They ha.d as .. 
senili.:Led\d-i'6HU."fet com.ventions. throughout the state to select delegates 
to the Whig national convention at Philadelphia. On March 15, 1848, 
Henry Wilson was named the delegate of the Eighth District and in the 
Fifth District, Charles Allen was elected. They would not support 
12 
Zachary Taylor or any slaveholder. After their selection, they met 
with Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, Stephen c. Phillips, E. 
Rockwood Hoar, and three other Whig abolitionists in Adam's Whi& office. 
They decided that if the Whigs at Philadelphia nominated Taylor for 
President, they would not support Taylor. To Phillips, however, they 
assigned the task of formulating a plan for opposition. 
Meanwhile, the Whigs also aligned their possible nominees along 
11 
David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 153. 
12 Frank Otto Gatell, "Conscience and Judgment: the Bolt of the 
Massachusetts Conscience Whigs," The Historian, XXI (November, 1958), 
P• 21. 
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pro- and anti-slavery lines. Clay seemed a logical candidate for the 
Whigs. Yet Southern Whigs recalled his "Raleigh letters," while 
Northern Whigs remembered his subsequent letters. To ruin Clay would 
ruin the party's success. Taylor's name frequently was mentioned. The 
Southern Whigs reasoned that not only was Taylor popular with the pub~. 
lie, but he was a champion of the Southern cause. 
During the campaign of 1848 efforts were made to establish a 
Taylor bloc in New York City. Earlier attempts had been disrupted by 
Clay's Whig "roughs." Alexander Stephens arranged for Isiah Rhynders, 
"captain among toughs and shoulder hitters in New York" and a Taylor 
man, to insure an uninterrupted speech given by Toombs in a hall in 
the city. The price for this was two hundred dollars. 13 At Rhynder's 
suggestion, Toombs met with some of the Rhynder boys at a favorite 
saloon to establish comaradarie the night before his speech. The next 
evening Toomb's speech was interrupted by shouts of "slaveholder" and 
"a hurray for Clay." Toombs continued speaking. Again the cries 
erupted in the hall. Toombs began to question his success at estab-
lishing friendships in the saloon the night before. Then a great row 
broke out, and the hall was cleared of forty trouble-makers in two 
minutes. Toombs later discovered that during the initial heckling 
Rhynder's men had circulated and chalked the backs of the hecklers. 
. 14 
Then on order, they were bodily eJected. 
Other speeches were made on the behalf of Taylor by Northern as 
well as Southern Whigs. The Whig abolitionists decided to bolt the 
13william Y. Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 47. 
14Ibid. 
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national convention if Taylor was nominated. Actually many Whigs 
spoke of not holding a convention at all and merely placing Taylor 
on the Whig ticket. But on June 7 the Whigs held their national 
convention. They adopted no platform. After balloting three times, 
Taylor was selected the nominee of the Whig party. When the name of 
Abbott Lawrence was placed in nomination for vice-president, the Massa-
chusetts delegation became noisy. Charles Allen stated he felt the 
Whig party was dissolved, and Wilson declared he would return to 
15 
Massachusetts to help defeat the Whig slate. The rest of the Whigs 
tried to console the Conscience Whigs by nominating Millard Fillmore 
for the vice-presidency, but the Whig abolitionists had already made 
up their minds. Horace Greeley aptly described the Whig convention 
as "The Slaughterhouse of Whig Principles. 1116 
On June 10, a call for a convention was issued in Massachusetts 
for all those opposed to the nomination of Cass and Taylor to meet at 
Worcester the 28th of June. They selected Worcester as the convention 
site because of its reputation as a center of antislavery sentiment, 
and because of its central location and accessibility to Boston by 
railroad. 
Before they left Philadelphia, fifteen antislavery Whigs met to 
lay the groundwork for a convention of all factions opposed to slavery. 
They suggested that it be held in Buffalo during the first week of 
August. Adams and his fellow Whig abolitionists prepared a big welcome 
15Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner (4 vols., 
Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893'5-:-111, p. 162. 
16 
Frank Otto Gatell, John Gorham Palfrey and the New England 
Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 160. 
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for Wilson and Allen. They had little time to prepare for the conven-
tion, so they sent invitations to men in Washington who were friendly 
to their cause. Conscience meetings occurred throughout the state to 
remind those interested in Worcester that half-fare rates would be 
in effect on the railroad. 17 
A few days before the Worcester convention, antislavery meetings 
also gathered in Ohio and New York. Salmon P. Chase led the meeti~g 
in Ohio, and the convention passed resolutions condemning any exten-. 
. f 1 18 sion o s avery. At Utica, the Barnburners nominated Van Buren, 
while the Ohio men did not nominate anyone. 
The air in the town hall of Worcester was warm on June 28, 1848; 
the emotional fervor of five-thousand free-soilers made it so. Be-
cause of the large crowd, the convention adjourned to the Common where 
the hot sun blazed down upon the heads of an assemblage of disaffected 
Whigs, Democrats, and Liberty men. Toward the afternoon they sought 
protection in a shadier place called the Grove, which adjoined the 
Worcester Lunatic Asylum (the afternoon location seemed quite appro-
priate to the Taylor Whig press.) 19 These Whigs who initiated the 
meeting on that scorching summer day were the protesters of their 
time. They enthusiastically greeted speakers from remnants of all 
parties. Although they did not choose a nominee, the Conscience Whigs 
did question Van Buren's sincerity. However, they soon realized that 
he was all they had, and thus was sure to be the nominee at Buffalo in 
17 Ga tell~ "Conscience and Judgment", p. 31. 
18Ibid., P• 31. 
19Ibid., P• 33. 
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August. During July these Whigs tried to find a replacement for Van 
Buren, but they could not. While organizing antislavery sentiment in 
their own state, the Massachusetts Whig abolitionists aided rebellion 
in other states. Adams managed the "Conscience Whig Speakers' Bureau" 
which sent speakers to various states to gain support for the Free-Soil 
movement. Sumner played an important role in the pre-convention dis-
cussions, for he had close friends among the Barnburners and had cru-
saded for other reforms which had won him many admirers in the Liberty 
party. Sumner persuaded Van Buren to write antislavery letters and 
20 
Hale to withdraw from the campaign. 
The party insurrections against both Taylor and Cass seemed over-
whelming when on August 9 antislavery factions from all free states 
flocked to the Buffalo City Park. Meeting under a spacious tent, their 
numbers estimated between ten and forty thousand, these men adopted a 
21 clearly stated platform. They accepted constitutional limitations 
which excluded interference with slavery in the states, but they de-• 
clared it a national duty to prevent, by the law, the extension of 
slavery in national territories and no further continuance of slavery 
22 wherever governmental power extended. A bargain was made on the plat-
form and on the nominee. Liberty party leaders agreed to back Van Buren 
if the Barnburners would support a Liberty platform. After the plat-
form was approved amidst much waving of hats and handkerchiefs, Van 
Buren was nominated unanimously as the Free-Soil candidate for Presi-
20 
Donald, Charles Sumner, p. 164. 
21P· . 160 ierce, Memoir, III, p. • 
22 b"d 169 Ii., P• • 
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dent. To balance the ticket, they selected Charles Francis Adams, who 
had presided over the convention, as their candidate for Vice-President. 
They had a colorful and tuneful campaign, and the Free-Soilers sang 
themselves hoarse by election day. The Massachusetts' Conscience men 
knew they had little chance of winning; their only hope was to throw 
the election to the House of Representatives. To Adams, it was more 
23 
important that a national movement had been made. Taylor's nomination 
offended many Whigs because he was not a stateman in the Whig tradition. 
However, in the election in 1848 Taylor won and Van Buren received 
only one-tenth of the popular vote. The Free-Soilers elected nine 
members to Congress which gave them the balance of power in the House. 
Large numbers of antislavery Whigs gave Taylor their votes because he 
24 
had stated he was against the executive use of the veto power. Fill-
more, the Whig candidate for the vice-presidency, proved harmful to 
Taylor in the South. The Democrats had reminded Southern Whigs that 
soldiers of the field did not always live long in the presidential 
h . 25 c air. The Whigs mostly dwelt on "Old Zack" and his war record in 
their campaign south of the Mason-Dixon line. 
Of course the Whigs celebrated their return to power. Little did 
they know that Taylor would favor the policy of allowing territories 
to settle the slavery question for themselves without executive inter-
23Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 156. 
24Pierce, Memoir, III, p. 168. 
25Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington: 
American Historical Association, 1913), p. 131. 
ferences. But it happened, and it drove those Southerners who had 
been his most enthusiastic supporters into complete opposition to 
him. 26 At his death, there ironically were no more sincere mourners 
27 
than the antislavery men of the free states. 
26Ibid., P• 134. 




After the election of 1848, the Free-Soilers in many states 
pondered their future. The results of this election had complicated 
matters for them. They had only one tenth of the voters in their 
ranks; they lacked representatives in the electoral college; and they 
had failed to achieve a majority in a single Congressional district. 
Without success as a party in a single state, they could not expect 
national success. Because larger parties attracted the masses of 
citizens, the Free-Soilers thought they would be fortunate to keep 
half of their voting forces. 1 No longer could they be content ''with 
merely a moral demonstration. 112 With the Whig and Democratic parties 
well-balanced, the Free Soilers decided they could become the "fulcrum" 
which could upset that balance--if the parties would help secure the 
election of senators and representatives in Congress committed to Free-
Soil principles. By making their power felt, the Free-Soilers could 
obtain their ideals by coalitions. 
In New Hampshire, Hale had gained his seat in the Senate by a 
coalition of Independent Democrats, Whig abolitionists, and Liberty 
men in 1846. This successful attempt became the national model and 
1Edward Pierce, Memoir and L~tters of Charles Sumner (4 vols., 
Boston: Roberts Brothers, i893), III, p-.-183. 
2Ibid., p. 184. 
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spurred the Free-Soilers to attempt simil~r actions in other states. 
Early in 1849, the Free-Soilers in Ohio, with only two votes in the 
legislature, joined with the Democrats to elect Democratic judges who 
voided anti-Negro legislation, and to send Salmon P. Chase to the 
Senate. In Iowa the Free-Soilers and the Whigs united; in Connecticut 
and Vermont Free-Soilers and Democrats combined. 
The Barnburners and the Hunker sections of the New York Democratic 
party reunited. Under the plurality system in that state, the Taylor 
Whigs, although a minority, could win control of the state. With the 
defection of the Barnburners, the only state Free-Soil party which had 
not formed coalitions, that in Massachusetts, began to reconsider its 
position. Charles Francis Adams, who had been the most powerful Free-
Soiler in that state, found his influence waning, and he suspected 
that Free-Soil principles would be lost in Democratic platforms. In 
1849 the Massachusetts Democrats adopted strong antislavery resolutions. 
The Massachusetts Free-Soilers realized that in order to eliminate the 
reigning "Cotton" Whigs from power they would have to unite with the 
Democrats. This overpowering temptation weaken Adams' position. 3 
John Gorham Palfrey, a close friend of Adams, ran for representa-
tive from Middlesex County under the Free-Soil banner in 1848. Palfrey 
did not receive a majority; therefore he had to face a run off in the 
sununer. To help Palfrey, Adams agreed to a coalition with the Demo-
crats. Other counties followed the Middlesex example, thereby electing 
a total of thirteen senators and 130 representatives; but the Democrats 
failed to keep their bargain in Middlesex. Adams regretted the course 
3Martin G. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 165. 
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taken, and he never again associated himself with the Democrats. 
When Adams visited Washington in December, 1849, he heard much 
discussion about the Thirty-first Congress. Although the Mexican War 
had already ended on the battlefield, it continued in Congress. The 
territory won from Mexico needed to be organized. In California, 
prospectors lusted for gold, and its discovery had brought settlers 
who clamored for statehood. While the Northern radicals demanded 
the Wilmot Proviso, Southern extremists openly threatened disunion. 
Fearing civil war, many proviso men retreated. 
On December 24, 1849, President Taylor delivered his first annual 
message, which was surprisingly antislavery in tone. He discouraged 
sectional agitation by omitting any mention concerning slavery. 
California should be accepted as a state when it applied for admis-
sion, he said. The same method should be followed for New Mexico. 
Adams felt that Taylor was trying to ignore the problem cf slavery 
h h 1 . 4 rat er tan so ve it. 
Later, Adams changed his position when confronted with what he 
considered a worse solution presented by Henry Clay in the Senate on 
January 29, 1850. Clay suggested California be admitted as a state 
under its "free" constitution. The rest of the Mexican territory 
should be divided into the two territorial governments of Utah and 
New Mexico. Pronouncement on slavery for the two territories would 
be withheld. The slave trade should be abolished in the District of 
Columbia, while Congress would have no power to restrict interstate 
slave trade. The boundary between Texas and New Mexico should be 
\bid., p. 164. 
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settled, and a more stringent fugitive-slave law should be passed. 
The Free-Soilers violently denounced Clay's proposals, which would be-
come the heart of the Compromise of 1850, as a compromise of moral 
principles. When Daniel Webster addressed the Senate on March 7, he 
proclaimed that arguments concerning slavery in the Mexican territory 
were useless; Nature had made slavery impossible in that territory. 
He found little backing from his home state of Massachusetts for these 
views, however. 
In the spring of 1850 the leaders of the Democratic party lined 
up support for Clay's compromise. Northern Whigs except Webster 
favored Taylor's plan, however. When President Taylor died on July 9, 
1850, the Free-Soilers lost their major ally in fighting Clay. Millard 
Fillmore became President, and with him came a new cabinet which in-
eluded Webster as Secretary of State. During August and September the 
Clay measures passed Congress one by one, and became the law of the 
land. By the November elections in Massachusetts in 1850, Adams and 
many other former Whig abolitionists were thinking that the morals of 
the Free-Soil party had been destroyed, and they realized their roles 
within that party would soon end. 5 
The presidential election of 1852 in a sense served as a popular 
referendum on the Compromise of 1850. The Democrats nominated Franklin 
Pierce who had endorsed the Compromise; the Whigs, divided as always, 
chose the Mexican War hero, General Winfield Scott, whose position on 
the Compromise was uncertain. The Free-Soilers offered John P. Hale 
for the presidency. The Democrats carried twenty-seven states and the 
5rbid., p. 174. 
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Whigs four, while the Free-Soilers fared poorly because the Barnburners 
had left the party. Yet the election of 1852 deflated the Whig party 
so much that it never again was sufficiently strong to offer a candidate 
in a presidential election. In the Mid West a new organization would 
gradually replace the Whig and Free-Soil parties--the Republicans. 
The role of the Whig abolitionists from 1841 to 1848 cannot be 
underestimated. Certainly they found aid and encouragement from Great 
Britain. In the early stage of the development of the Whig abolition-
ists, the questions concerning slavery were avoided in Congress by veil-
iRg~lt:with a "gauze" called the Gag Rule. Southern members of Congress 
could avoid the slavery issue by simply enforcing the Gag Rule whenever 
a petition or memorial arose which related to slavery. Former President 
John Quincy Adams successfully fought this measure because he thought 
it to be a direct violation of the constitutional right of petition. 
Although not an abolitionist, Adams found himself a defender of abo-
litionist petitions. American abolitionists, such as Theodore Weld, 
Joshua Leavitt, and Louis Tappan, came to Washington at the request of 
Whig congressmen who sympathized with the antislavery cause. There 
the abolitionists would research and write speeches for Adams and anti-
slavery Whigs. These abolitionists also corresponded with their 
British counterparts; Weld's writings against slavery made him the 
most respected American abolitionist in Great Britain, while Leavitt 
and Tappan actively represented the United States' abolitionists at 
the World Anti-Slavery Conventions held in London. 
While in London, Leavitt and Tappan grew confident that the 
~ritish abolitionists, although their extraordinary influence with 
the British goverrnnent, were stoutly opposed to the annexation of 
Texas. The British feared the extension of slavery into the new 
republic should the United States annex it. In these conventions the 
British verbally assured the American abolitionists that they would 
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try to prevent the "slaveocracy conspiracy" from succeeding. In the 
United States these assurances became known to the public. Southerners, 
feeling their constitutional rights of property were being threatened, 
denounced the British scheme, while Northerners, fearing the loss of 
the South's cotton for their textile mills, joined the Southerners. 
Thus in addition to economic motives, the Northerners had political 
motives. 
With the election of 1844 near, neither party wanted to endanger 
itself on the issue of slavery. Only one party definitely stood against 
slavery and the annexation of Texas--the Liberty party. The Whigs, 
whose candidate was Henry Clay, fluctuated on a vapid platform. No 
one knew what Clay's position would be from one day to the next. Not 
so with James K. Polk and the Democrats; they wanted Texas annexed. 
Had the Whigs and Liberty men joined forces, they might have won, 
but they could not do so. Because of Polk's election, Congress 
annexed Texas by joint resolution. The Whigs who voted for this 
measure did so out of political and economical expediency. 
A few Democrats and Whig abolitionists had predicted that annexa-
tion of Texas would result in a war with Mexico and sectional incompati-
bility; their forecasts proved to be true in effect, although there was 
no direct cause-effect relationship. The Whig party derisively scorned 
the Democrats about the Mexican War while hypocritically voting fot 
supplies and for troops to sustain a war which they denounced. 
Only sixteen Whigs in Congress voted against acknowledging a state 
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of war with Mexico. Those Whigs came to be known under various names 
such as ''Whig abolitionists,''· "Conscience Whigs,!!· and "Young Whigs.II 
They tried to work within their party and change it, but the possibili-
ty of political power stifled the Whig party's principles. Winning 
elections became more important to the Whigs than upholding principles. 
The Whig abolitionists found that they were not the only ones disap-
pointed with their party's leaders; so also the Democrats, who thereby 
lost the election of 1848. 
In the conventions of 1848 Democratic and Whig abolitionists 
bolted their parties. Again, their actions were based on the moral 
issue of slavery. The Whig abolitionists served as examples for their 
Democratic counterparts, but even more important., their actions had 
been carefully planned and deliberate, Tired of being powerfless with-
in the Whig party structure, the Conscience Whigs devised a solution to 
their problem: they would promote the establishment of a Northern 
antislavery third party which would be composed of disenchanted Demo-
crats, Whigs, and Liberty men. 
Through the initiative of the Conscience Whigs, such a party did 
develop, called the Free-Soil party. Although unsuccessful in presi-
dential elections in 1848 and 1852, the Free-Soil party accomplished 
much. After the election of 1848 its members began to form coalitions 
with the party that would support the Free-Soil philosophy. Through 
these methods the Whig abolitionists triumphed. The result was the 
death of the Whig party and the birth of the Republican party. Politi-
cal compromises were on the threshold of giving way to political 
polemics. 
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